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1. INTRODUCTION
Globalization presents certain dilemmas for domestic law. Global
movements of people, things, and symbols have created a dense web of
transnational connections and have made people increasingly aware of
these relationships. Such changes problematize the Westphalian
assumption that the territorial state should provide the frame for debates
about justice.' Nevertheless, state laws and institutions are typically
founded on a territorially-bounded notion of democracy. Although these
laws and institutions may be mobilized to remedy injustices beyond the
state, the intended beneficiaries of such initiatives have little if any say in
the process. State lawmakers who want to respond to global injustices
thus need some way of overcoming this apparent democratic deficit.
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This article illustrates this dilemma and explores their implications
through an analysis of a recent Canadian statute, the Official
Development Assistance Accountability Act.2 Enacted in 2008, this law
requires cabinet ministers responsible for the provision of Canadian aid
to be of the opinion that this aid contributes to poverty reduction, takes
into account the perspectives of the poor, and conforms to international
human rights standards.' It also mandates a series of reports in which the
government is meant to document its compliance with
these requirements.'
As this article explains, the creation of the ODA Accountability Act
was championed by a small group of activists who wanted Canadian aid
to respond to global injustices, understood in terms of poverty,
inequality, and human rights violations. This article describes how these
activists faced resistance from various actors, mainly representing the
government, who thought that aid should promote Canadian economic
and security interests. The debates surrounding the Act thus reflected
basic disagreements about the appropriate frame for questions of justice.
Nevertheless, the political debate surrounding the ODA Accountability
Act was largely a domestic affair, in which almost all of the participants
were Canadian. The proponents of the Act employed a number of
strategies to overcome this democratic deficit. Foremost among these
strategies was an appeal to a managerial conception of development
assistance. Another important strategy was the incorporation of norms
and standards borrowed from international organizations.
This article argues that neither of these approaches provides a
satisfactory response to democratic concerns. Managerialism purportedly
transforms political conflicts into technical problems to be resolved
through the application of expert knowledge. But the
ways these problems are defined, and the ways this knowledge is
generated and applied, are themselves highly political. And the
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international organizations that generate norms and standards related to
development assistance can be said to suffer from democratic deficits of
their own. Moreover, the norms and standards produced by these
organizations tend to be compatible with an expert-led, managerial
form of governance.
The theoretical building blocks of this argument appear in Part 2 of
this article. I begin with a brief discussion of globalization and
its implications for debates about justice. Different accounts of global
justice are expressed in different approaches to development assistance
policy. However, the governance of development assistance tends to
be infused with a managerial ethos that allows development agencies
to sidestep these questions. I also examine the role of donor
country legislation in development assistance. The example of the
United Kingdom's International Development Act 20021 shows that the
existence of a statutory framework for aid does not preclude a
managerial approach.
In Part 3 of this article, I describe the ODA Accountability Act and tell
the story of its creation. Participants in the debates surrounding the Act
expressed different visions of global justice. Nevertheless, the legislative
process was essentially a domestic matter and therefore appears to have
involved a democratic deficit. However, the proponents of the ODA
Accountability Act appealed to a managerial conception of development
assistance in order to bypass such questions of democracy. Although the
proponents at times acknowledged shortcomings in the way
development assistance is governed, their preferred solution was to
confer more discretionary authority on those perceived as having the
expertise to manage aid properly.
In Part 4, I examine the role of globalized norms and standards. The
ODA Accountability Act incorporates a number of norms and standards
borrowed from international development assistance organizations. In
principle, recourse to such instruments might be imagined as a way of




these norms and standards raise a new set of problems. First, the
institutions that generate them are themselves unrepresentative. Second,
these institutions, too, tend to promote a managerial response to global
poverty that excludes alternative kinds of political claims. Such
managerial tendencies can even be observed in the way aid organizations
have dealt with human rights. While the proponents of the Act were
critical of the democratic deficit in international development
institutions, and tried (unsuccessfully) to incorporate such a critique into
the Act, they did not call managerialism into question.
In conclusion, I suggest that the case of the ODA Accountability Act
has broader implications for the way Canadians (and perhaps citizens of
other countries) think about law and globalization. For those with
cosmopolitan or internationalist moral commitments, the mobilization
of domestic law to combat global injustices holds a strong appeal.
However, it is important to consider how such responses may themselves
give rise to new kinds of injustice. If one wants to imagine how to
respond to global injustice, institutional structures, globalized norms and
standards, as well as expert knowledge practices must all be subjected to
critical scrutiny.
2. GLOBALIZATION, JUSTICE, LAW,
AND MANAGERIALISM
In the last few decades, human beings have become increasingly aware of
the global interconnectedness of economic, social, and cultural life. Such
interconnectedness, often referred to as "globalization", implies that the
state might no longer provide an adequate frame for debates about
justice. Some domestic lawmakers might even be inclined to modify
their own legal systems to reflect transnational moral claims. However,
state laws and institutions are not ideal vehicles for global justice. Most
importantly, they are typically based on a bounded concept of
democracy, and they therefore have a democratic deficit in relation to
people beyond their borders. In order to respond to global injustices,
state lawmakers must address this democratic deficit.
In this regard, it is worth noting that both state institutions and
international organizations have increasingly employed a "managerial"
approach to transnational governance. In a managerial approach,
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questions of legal rights and obligations are set aside and replaced by
questions of "interests" and "objectives". Managerialism can thus provide
an appearance of consensus and a way of avoiding issues that appear
overly political. However, as I shall argue, managerialism serves more to
conceal the operation of power than to democratize it.
All of these tendencies can be observed in the governance of
development assistance. As I shall explain, in the name of "development",
donor countries and international organizations distribute material
resources to poorer countries in the form of grants, loans, equipment,
and commodities. Donors also provide services, or human resources, in
the form of education, training, and technical advice. I argue that these
transfers have important political implications. Some citizens of donor
countries imagine these transfers as responses to global injustices. But
development assistance is generally portrayed by its practitioners as a
technical rather than a political matter.
2.1 GLOBALIZATION, JUSTICE, AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN
STATE INSTITUTIONS
The best succinct definition of globalization comes from the
philosopher Jitrgen Habermas:
By "globalization" is meant the cumulative processes of a worldwide
expansion of trade and production, commodity and financial markets,
fashions, the media and computer programs, news and communications
networks, transportation systems and flows of migration, the risks
generated by large-scale technology, environmental damage and
epidemics, as well as organized crime and terrorism.'
Historians have described globalization as a geographically uneven
phenomenon that has ebbed and flowed over the centuries.
7
Nevertheless, certain aspects of globalization have intensified in recent
decades. Between 1990 and 2005, world merchandise trade increased at
6 Jiirgen Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006) at 175.
See Jirgen Osterhammel & Niels P Petersson, Globalization: A Short History
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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an average rate of almost 6% per year-more than double the average
annual percentage increase in world production during that period. The
anthropologist Arjun Appadurai argues that increases in migration and
electronic media since the 1970s have produced a globalization of
cultural consciousness that is so novel as to constitute a
historical rupture.9
Globalization has changed the way many scholars, citizens,
and lawmakers think about justice. As the political theorist Nancy Fraser
has noted, debates about justice during the immediate
postwar era-the heyday of the welfare state in Western Europe and
North America-largely focused on the issue of redistribution.
Moreover, participants in these debates tended to assume that the state
provided the frame in which justice claims could be articulated and in
which redistribution, if any, could occur. One's primary obligations of
justice were owed to one's fellow citizens. Outside events were
conceptualized as security issues or as "humanitarian" concerns rather
than questions of justice.'
As Fraser notes, the events of recent decades have called into question
this "Keynesian-Westphalian" paradigm. First, the growth of feminism
and other forms of identity politics have problematized the focus on
redistribution, giving equal prominence to questions of recognition.
Debates about justice must now address the question of "what?": the
relative priority to be accorded to different kinds of justice claims.
Second, globalization has made the state seem less appropriate as the site
for the institutionalization of justice." People all over the world
experience injustices that appear to be more attributable to outside actors
(other states, international organizations, transnational corporations)
than to any domestic source. Moreover, since the 1970s, the
international human rights movement has provided a popular
See WTO, International Trade Statistics 2006 (Geneva: WTO, 2006) at 25.
Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996) at 2-11, 28-31.
10 Fraser, supra note 1 at 12-13.
"Ibid at 13-21.
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vocabulary that makes it easier for people to articulate political claims in
universal terms.12 Finally, since the late 1970s, philosophers and political
theorists have articulated global theories of justice, inspired by Kantian3
as well as utilitarian1 moral theory. Debates about justice must therefore
address the question of "who?": the appropriate political community
within which questions of justice should be addressed.
As Fraser explains, responses to this "who" question fall into three
different camps. At one end, there are liberal-nationalists, who argue that
questions of justice should be settled within each national community.
At the other extreme, there are cosmopolitans, who argue that national
borders are morally irrelevant, and that obligations of recognition or
redistribution are independent of geography. In between are
internationalists, who acknowledge transnational moral obligations, but
argue that these are somewhat weaker than the moral obligations among
citizens of the same country.5
These debates about the appropriate frame for justice are relevant in
the realm of development assistance. Since the 194 0s, development
assistance has been officially described as a response to poverty.'6 The
governments of Western countries (and the international organizations
12 See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 2010).
13 See e.g. Charles R Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1979); John Rawls, The Law ofPeoples with "The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited" (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999);
Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and
Reforms (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2002) [Pogge, World Poverty].
14 See e.g. Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven, Conn:
Yale University Press, 2002).
15 Fraser, supra note 1 at 32-33.
16 See Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the
Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) at 22. For example,
in the late 1940s the World Bank identified "underdeveloped" countries as those
with an annual per capita income of less than US$100. See Majid Rahnema,
"Poverty" in Wolfgang Sachs, ed, The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge
as Power (London, UK: Zed Books, 1992) 158 at 161.
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they established) began to provide development assistance in the 1940s
and 1950s at roughly the same time they were constructing their
domestic welfare states. Many citizens of donor countries understood
development assistance as a projection of social-democratic values onto a
global scale. Public support for aid in donor countries has closely tracked
public support for domestic welfare policies; aid is more popular on the
centre-left than on the centre-right." Development assistance can
therefore be understood as a modest form of redistribution, a response to
global inequality as well as poverty.
However, donor countries have also provided development assistance
for reasons that have had little to do with poverty or inequality. It was
recognized from the outset, in the 194 0s, that development assistance
was part of a Cold War strategy. For the US government, development
assistance was meant to induce other countries to adopt a capitalist
economic model and to align themselves with the US against the Soviet
Union. Moreover, by "tying" aid to the procurement of their own goods
and services, donor countries could use aid as a domestic subsidy. Donors
also devised mixed credit schemes, in which aid was used as an incentive
to secure commercial deals; aid could also be used to help finance
overseas investments by donor country firms, or to build up bilateral
trading relationships with particular countries." Citizens of donor
countries who rejected the notion of global redistribution, but merely
sought to promote their own countries' national interests, thus found
reasons to endorse development assistance programs.
Contemporary debates about aid policy, from the perspective of
donor countries, still largely turn on whether and to what extent
participants recognize collective moral obligations toward people in
other countries. Positions in these policy debates have generally
1 See David Halloran Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign
Aid Regime, 1949-1989 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) at
182-90; Alain Noel & Jean-Philippe Thirien, "From Domestic to International
Justice: The Welfare State and Foreign Aid" (1995) 49:3 International
Organization 523.
1 See Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007) at 12-15.
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corresponded to different points on the political spectrum." Those on
the right have generally adopted an "international realist" approach to
foreign policy. International realists support aid if and only if it serves
the interests of the donor country. International realists have therefore
favoured the use of aid for propping up friendly regimes, securing
commercial advantages, or providing symbolic expressions of wealth,
power, and benevolence. They have seen economic development as
incidental to these goals. They have regarded poverty reduction as a
humanitarian concern-something better left to private initiative.20 The
international realist approach to aid policy affirms a strongly nationalist
version of justice: obligations of justice are only relevant within the
national community. Beyond the border or the water's edge, foreign aid
is seen as a matter of charity or prudence, but not a matter of justice.
Closer to the political centre, liberal internationalists have generally
seen aid as a way of promoting economic growth. Liberal
internationalists therefore endorse expanded trade, which they imagine
will benefit both rich and poor countries.21 However, in principle, liberal
internationalists oppose the use of aid as a subsidy to particular firms or
" The following analysis is loosely inspired by that found in Cranford Pratt, "Humane
Internationalism: Its Significance and Its Variants" in Cranford Pratt, ed,
Internationalism under Strain: The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989) 3 at 13-20
[Pratt, "Humane Internationalism"].
20 See e.g. Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State?: External Aid in Canada' Foreign Policy
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966). For an analogous US perspective, see
Samuel P Huntington, "Foreign Aid for What and for Whom" (1970-71) 1 Foreign
Policy 161; Samuel P Huntington, "Foreign Aid for What and for Whom (II)"
(1971) 2 Foreign Policy 114.
21 See e.g. Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: TFhy the Poorest Countries Are Failing and
What Can Be Done about It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Such ideas can
be traced to the work of classical liberal theorists. See e.g. David Ricardo, "On the
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation" in Piero Sraffa, ed, The Works and
Correspondence of David Ricardo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951)
vol 1 at 128-49; John Stuart Mill, The Principles of'Political Economy: With Some of
Their Applications to Social Philosophy, revised ed (London, UK: Colonial Press,
1900) vol 2 at 92-124.
455
UBC LAW REVIEW
industries, seeing these as market distortions.22 Moreover, applying a
Keynesian logic, liberal internationalists have generally concluded that
prosperity depends on widespread economic participation, and that the
poor require aid during the initial stages of economic growth. They have
therefore supported a modestly redistributive approach to aid.23
However, liberal internationalists do not necessarily recognize global
obligations of distributive justice. The belief that a rising tide will lift all
boats allows them to sidestep, to some extent, the question of global
inequality and any moral implications it might have.
To the left of centre, social-democratic internationalists have
championed the idea that aid should be allocated according to need.4
Unlike liberal internationalists, they have explicitly associated aid with
the reduction of international economic inequalities, and have drawn an
analogy between aid and the redistributive institutions of the welfare
state.25 Projecting the domestic politics of social democracy onto the
international scale, social-democratic internationalists endorse
redistribution because it is the right thing to do and because it might
help to stave off depression, war, and revolution.26 They have therefore
promoted "social" forms of aid and argued that these should target the
22 See e.g. Catrinus JJepma, The Tying ofAid (Paris, France: OECD, 1991).
23 See e.g. Jeffrey D Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time
(New York: Penguin Press, 2005).
24 See e.g. Brian Tomlinson, "Approaches to Strengthening CIDA: Creating an
Effective Government Department for International Cooperation" (2009), online:
Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) <www.ccic.ca>. This
normative concern is often expressed in the form of a criticism of aid allocations
based on other criteria. See e.g. Thomas Pogge, "Priorities of Global Justice" (2001)
32:1-2 Metaphilosophy 6 at 10.
25 See e.g. Independent Commission on International Development Issues,
North-South: A Program for Survival (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1980)
at 20-21, 77.
26 Ibid. On the politics of social democracy at the domestic level, see generally Tony
Judt, Ill Fares the Land (New York: Penguin Press, 2010).
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poorest people in the poorest countries.27 They have also argued that
donors should behave altruistically. They are critical of the pursuit of
commercial and security interests through aid, because they see these as
likely to involve departures from a needs-based allocation."
Nevertheless, social-democratic internationalists stop short of
full-fledged cosmopolitanism: they do not go so far as to endorse global
equalization of income and wealth across countries; they thus affirm that
obligations of justice within the national community are somewhat
stronger than those beyond it.
These different political orientations-international realism, liberal
internationalism, and social-democratic internationalism-are meant as
ideal types; they are not mutually exclusive. In policy and practice, they
frequently overlap.29 On one hand, international realists and liberal
internationalists share a belief that aid should strengthen trading
relationships, and that specific aid allocations can legitimately make both
donors and recipients better off. On the other hand, liberal
internationalists and social-democratic internationalists share a sense
that wealthy countries should be concerned with the welfare of the poor.
They also share a sense that poverty reduction is in the long-term
self-interest of donor countries.
State institutions help to put these different policy approaches into
practice. National "bilateral" aid agencies, established by most Western
donor countries in the early 1960s, play a key role in development
assistance, working alongside international organizations such as the
World Bank and the United Nations agencies. Indeed, in this field, as in
many others, state institutions are important players in global
2 See e.g. Denis Cogneau & Jean-David Naudet, "Who Deserves Aid? Equality of
Opportunity, International Aid, and Poverty Reduction" (2007)
35:1 World Development 104.
28 See e.g. Jamie Swift & Brian Tomlinson, eds, Conflicts of Interest: Canada and the
Third World (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1991).
29 See Pratt "Humane Internationalism', supra note 19 at 20-21.
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governance. The governments of wealthy countries have vast resources at
their disposal as well as a high degree of organizational capacity."
Nevertheless, the pursuit of global justice through state
institutions-if this is how bilateral aid is understood-gives rise to a
conceptual challenge. While state institutions might be reoriented
toward global justice, they are formally accountable only to their home
countries' parliaments and citizens. People beyond the state, including
aid recipients, typically have no say in the governance of these
institutions. These institutions can therefore be said to suffer from a
democratic deficit. Or, to use Fraser's terminology, they perpetuate a
political injustice: people are excluded from debates in which they ought
to be allowed to participate.
One response to allegations of a democratic deficit in development
organizations has been to solicit the informal "participation" of aid
recipients through surveys, public meetings, and other activities designed
to gather input from individuals and communities affected by aid
interventions. The idea of participation was initially promoted in the
1980s by actors who were critical of bureaucratic practices and sought o
reform development assistance by dispersing power to its beneficiaries.32
However, participatory methods have also been heavily criticized.3 3 One
concern is that participatory methods may produce a facade of
consensus, masking power relations and political conflicts within the
recipient community. Another concern is that participatory methods are
unlikely to alter the underlying relationship between donors and
30 In the year 2012, for example, donor country members of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) provided over US$88 billion in bilateral official development
assistance. See OECD, Statistics on Resource Flows to Developing Countries, Table 12,
online: <www.oecd.org>.
31 Fraser, supra note 1 at 16-18.
32 See e.g. Robert Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First (Essex:
Longman Scientific & Technical, 1983).
3 See Bill Cooke & Uma Kothari, eds, Participation: The New Tyranny? (London, UK:
Zed Books, 2001).
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recipients. Donor institutions using participatory methods usually retain
ultimate decision-making authority.
It should be acknowledged that these allegations of a democratic
deficit are mainly aimed at official policy- and decision-making
processes. Some scholars have argued that the day-to-day operations of
development agencies are much more flexible and responsive to aid
recipients than their organization charts would suggest. The
anthropologist David Mosse argues that large development
organizations have only a limited ability to exercise centralized,
hierarchical forms of power. Mosse suggests that the development field
contains myriad opportunities for agency and resistance." Or, as Mosse
puts it, "the hegemonic potential of international aid is always limited by
this autonomy of practice from policy (and policy from practice)."35
2.2 MANAGERIALISM IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
How can organizations responsible for development assistance respond
to allegations of a democratic deficit? It may be easier for them to dodge
these allegations than to respond to them. If development assistance can
be depoliticized, issues of representation and participation may seem less
salient. One particularly effective strategy for depoliticizing development
assistance has been the portrayal of such activities as essentially technical
or managerial.
The mobilization of technical knowledge has long been a central
feature of development assistance. During the immediate postwar era,
when aid was based on planning and modernization theory, donor
institutions relied heavily on macroeconomics. Engineers also held a
prominent role: they were needed to build dams, highways, and other
34 David Mosse, Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice
(London, UK: Pluto Press, 2005) at 6-11. See also James Ferguson, TheAnti-Politics
Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) at 280-82.
3 David Mosse, "Global Governance and the Ethnography of International Aid" in
David Mosse & David Lewis, eds, The Aid Effect: Giving and Governing in
InternationalDevelopment (London: Pluto Press, 2005) 1 at 23.
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infrastructure. The expansion of development assistance into "social"
concerns in the 1960s and 1970s implied the relevance of additional
kinds of experts, including medical doctors, public health specialists,
biologists, demographers, statisticians, sociologists, and anthropologists.
In the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s, microeconomics became
dominant. The "governance" agenda of the 1990s made room for
lawyers, and so on.3 6
This reliance on technical knowledge has helped proponents and
practitioners of development assistance to portray their work as
apolitical. When US President Harry S. Truman announced, in his 1949
inaugural address, that the United States would begin providing aid to
"underdeveloped" countries, he emphasized the scientific and technical
nature of this enterprise. This emphasis helped Truman overcome
resistance from critics who saw such aid as overly political. 7
Development assistance has not only drawn upon technical expertise;
it has also helped to generate its own specialized forms of knowledge. For
example, the macroeconomic approaches of the postwar era gave rise,
within the academy, to a specialized subfield known as "development
economics". The 1960s and 1970s turn to "social development" gave rise
to new interdisciplinary "development studies" programs."
In addition to scientific and technical knowledge, development
assistance organizations have invested a great deal in the elaboration of
formal managerial techniques. For example, many development
institutions employ "results-based management" processes, specifying
quantifiable outcomes and targets for their work, which are used to
measure performance.9 Scientific and technical knowledge is sometimes
36 See David Kennedy, "The 'Rule of Law,' Political Choices, and Development
Common Sense" in David M Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds, The New Law and
Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2006) 95 [David Kennedy, "Common Sense"].
Lumsdaine, supra note 17 at 232-33.
38 See David Kennedy, "Common Sense", supra note 36.
3 See e.g. Annette Binnendijk, Results Based Management in the Development
Co-operation Agencies: A Review of Experience: Background Report (2000) at 10,
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incorporated into such managerial processes. For example, some
economists have devised methods for measuring the number of people
lifted out of poverty per aid dollar spent; such measurements could
ostensibly guide the allocation of resources.0
Such managerial approaches are not confined to development
assistance. Indeed, they may be observed in many fields of contemporary
global governance. In the last few decades, many governance functions
have been assumed by international organizations dealing with subjects
such as economics, health, the environment, or security.)' In addition,
government officials from various countries have established professional
networks in which they share information and informally coordinate
their activities.42 Anne-Marie Slaughter has described such networking in
response to issues such as financial instability, corruption, pollution, and
terrorism. Slaughter's leading example is the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, in which the central bankers of 27 countries meet
to coordinate their national standards for the capital adequacy of private
banks. The political scientists Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal
have also described how non-state actors such as businesses and NGOs
have engaged in processes of "regulatory standard-setting" in order to
online: Development Assistance Committee Working Party on Aid
Evaluation <www.oecd.org>.
40 World Bank research in the late 1990s suggested that aid would be more effectively
used if concentrated in countries with the largest numbers of poor people. See e.g.
Paul Collier & David Dollar, "Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction" (2002) 46:8
European Economic Rev 1475; Nick Dyer et al, "Strategic Review of Resource
Allocation Priorities: Discussion Paper" (2003) [on file with author].
41 See generally Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, 2nd
ed (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
41 See Robert 0 Keohane & Joseph S Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and
International Organizations" (1974) 27:1 World Politics 39.
4 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2004) at 42-43.
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control the social and environmental effects of transnational business.'
A wide variety of actors thus participate in global governance. These
actors are brought together by their shared efforts to address particular
problems rather than any formal legal or constitutional arrangement.
In recent years, public international lawyers such as Martti
Koskenniemi have criticized this trend toward managerialism. As
Koskenniemi notes, a managerial approach replaces formal rules with
notions such as "interests" and "objectives". But, he argues, such notions
are theoretically unsound: they take for granted a set of actors whose
"interests" can be objectively determined, when this is never the case.
Moreover, the operationalization of such concepts is far from automatic.
Professional, expert judgment is required in order to translate these
concepts into policies, and in order to apply such policies to particular
instances. And each community of experts-whether its specialization is
economics, health, environment, or security-brings certain tacit
assumptions to its work. Managerial governance is therefore influenced
by the biases of whichever type of expertise happens to be dominant.5
Koskenniemi's critique of managerialism is linked to a defence of a
legal or constitutional approach to world affairs. The shortcomings of
managerialism are perhaps most apparent when it is contrasted with the
ideal of formal equality that informs international lawyers' professional
sensibilities. Nevertheless, Koskenniemi's critique of managerialism is
apposite even without this ideal as a reference point. To the extent that
domestic laws and institutions purport to address global issues, it is
appropriate to subject them to analogous critiques.
With regard to both domestic ("bilateral") and international
("multilateral") development assistance organizations, critics have
warned that their management practices and their uses of knowledge
give rise to certain biases. For example, donor institutions often generate
Kenneth W Abbott & Duncan Snidal, "Strengthening International Regulation
through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit"
(2009) 42 VandJ Transnat'l L 501.
45 Martti Koskenniemi, "Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian
Themes about International Law and Globalization" (2007) 8:1 Theor Inq L 9
at 16-17.
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macro-level statistical measures, such as per capita income, infant
mortality rates, daily caloric intake, life expectancy, and literacy. In
recent years, development institutions have aggregated such quantitative,
statistical information into a variety of indicators, indices, and
rankings." Perhaps the best known is the United Nations Development
Programme's Human Development Index, which aggregates data for
income, education, and life expectancy.]7 Such forms of knowledge create
a sense that disparate local circumstances are essentially commensurable.
They also imply the possibility of policy models and "best practices": if a
program is considered successful, development institutions may attempt
to "scale it up" or replicate it elsewhere." Such practices may serve to
hinder development initiatives that have their basis in particularistic
local knowledge."
Scholars have offered a number of other critiques of donor agencies'
management and knowledge practices. For example, it is argued that the
gathering of data serves as a form of surveillance;50  that the
46 See Sally Engle Merry, "Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global
Governance" (2011) 52: S3 Current Anthropology S83.
4 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2014,
online: <hdr.undp.org/en>.
4 See e.g. UN Millennium Project, online: <www.unmillenniumproject.org>.
' This is despite the fact that such institutions often proclaim the value of such
particularistic local approaches. For example, at the end of the 1990s, the World
Bank's chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz, criticized the "one size fits all" nature of
structural adjustment reforms and argued for policies that would be more tailored to
local society, politics, and institutions. See Joseph E Stiglitz, "Whither Reform?: Ten
Years of the Transition" (Paper delivered at the Annual Bank Conference on
Development Economics, Washington, DC, 28-30 April 1999), online:
<siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON1999/Resources/stigli
tz.pdf>. See also David Kennedy, "Common Sense', supra note 36 at 154-55.
50 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law fom Below: Development, Social
Movements and Third World Resistance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2003) at 104-06. Interestingly, those inclined toward the international-realist
approach have sometimes advanced this surveillance function as a justification for
aid. For example, in the 1960s, the Canadian political scientist Keith Spicer, supra
note 20 at 51, argued that aid programs should lead to understanding of the
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forward-looking nature of development practices" impedes any serious
reflection on the moral legacy of past injustices, such as slavery and
colonialism; that the "methodological nationalism"" of development
assistance obscures the causal role of global economic forces and diverts
attention from proposals for global regulation or redistribution; and
that development assistance enshrines Western-style growth and
modernization as a universal model, excluding alternative social visions
rooted in identity, culture, or tradition, as well as alternative economic
visions based on solidarity or collectivism.5 4
This critical perspective is not intended as a wholesale condemnation
of managerialism or of its role in development. It may be entirely
appropriate, in some circumstances, to treat poverty as a technical
problem to be solved by experts. The point is that such a response to
poverty should be recognized as a political choice, rather than as an
escape from politics. Managerial processes can never be wholly apolitical;
they have important, albeit occasionally subtle, distributive, and
discursive effects. Managerialism therefore does not provide a
developing nations' real needs, hopes, fears, prejudices, interests and expectations; to
understanding of their mentality, their culture, their society, their government; to
understanding, in sum, of their peoples-at every level of life, humble and exalted, to
which the day-to-day operations of aid assure a donor access. For aid is the ideal door
to dialogue with the peoples of developing nations; it offers a natural, believable
excuse to study them at close hand; it provides, through shared experience in their
most fundamental ong-range preoccupation, concrete and varied opportunities to
assess their motivations
51 See David Lewis, "International Development and the 'Perpetual Present':
Anthropological Approaches to the Re-historicization of Policy" (2009) 21:1
European J Development Research 32.
52 See generally Ulrich Beck, "Toward a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan
Intent" (2003) 10:4 Constellations 453.
5 See Pogge, World Poverty, supra note 13 at 139-44.
5 The idea of "development" has in fact been appropriated and syncretistically
reinvented in many different cultural and political contexts. See e.g. Escobar, supra
note 16 at 47-52; Rajagopal, supra note 50 at 233-71. But these alternative visions
are not necessarily recognized within the development assistance main stream.
464 VOL 48:2
2015 GLOBAL JUSTICE AND MANAGERIALISM
satisfactory way of avoiding allegations of a democratic deficit in the
context of state institutions involved in development assistance.
2.3 DONOR COUNTRY AID LAWS: A BRITISH MODEL
Many donor countries have enacted laws in relation to their aid
programs. At first glance, such laws might seem to provide a formal legal
framework for aid allocations-in contrast to a managerial approach.
However, upon closer inspection, such laws tend to be consistent with
managerialism. They generally empower government officials from the
donor country to manage aid in keeping with particular forms of
expertise. They may help to insulate aid allocations from external
pressures-a separation that helps to reinforce aid managers' claims to
stand outside or above politics.
I develop this argument through an account of the United Kingdom's
International Development Act 200211 and the debates surrounding it.
This legislation has significance beyond the United Kingdom. It was
part of a package of aid reforms that has been widely hailed as a model
for other donor countries to follow.5' And, as I shall explain below, it
provided the direct inspiration for Canadas ODA Accountability Act.
The International Development Act 2002 has its origins in the
mid-1990s, in a controversy involving the use of British aid funds. The
UK government had agreed to contribute £234 million toward the
construction of a hydroelectric station in Malaysia, in spite of reports
indicating that this dam would be inefficient. Around the same time,
Malaysia had purchased over £1 billion worth of weapons from the
United Kingdom. The World Development Movement, an NGO,
applied for judicial review of the decision to fund the hydroelectric
station, arguing that the true purpose of the aid funding was to provide
5 Supra note 5.
56 See Owen Barder, "Reforming Development Assistance: Lessons from the UK




an inducement for the sale of weapons.17 The High Court held that the
dam project was "economically unsound" and thus failed to meet the
statutory criteria for aid funding; it was, therefore, illegal." This "Pergau
Dam affair", as it came to be known, was a serious embarrassment to the
Conservative government of Prime Minister John Major.
When Tony Blair's Labour Party came to power in 1997, it promised
sweeping development assistance reforms. Clare Short, the new
Secretary of State for International Development, insisted on full
ministerial status and a voice in all British policies toward developing
countries.9 The aid administration was separated from the Foreign
Office and re-named the Department for International Development
(DFID). A 1997 White Paper declared poverty reduction to be the
overall goal of aid policy.o The United Kingdom also fully untied its aid
from national procurement requirements, and increased the size of its
aid programs."
During Blair's second term, the UK Parliament enacted the
International Development Act 2002. The International Development Act
2002 is centred on the concept of poverty reduction. It empowers the
Secretary of State to provide development assistance "if he is satisfied
that the provision of the assistance is likely to contribute to a reduction
in poverty."6' This provision was meant to clarify the purpose of aid to
exclude extraneous considerations such as the arms sales that led to the
Pergau Dam funding. Clare Short accordingly used the International
Development Act 2002 to convince her cabinet colleagues to abandon a
5 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, exparte World Development Movement Ltd,
[1995] 1 All ER 611, [1995] 1 WLR 386 [cited to All ER].
51 Ibid at 626.
' See Barder, supra note 56 at 13.
60 See Clare Short, "Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century",
White Paper on International Development (1997), online: University of Bristol
<www.bristol.ac.uk>.
61 See Barder, supra note 56 at 21-22.
62 Supra note 5, s 1(1).
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plan to make aid conditional on recipient countries' acceptance of the
return of asylum seekers.6 1
The International Development Act 2002 (and the accompanying
package of aid reforms) can be seen as an attempt to promote a social-
democratic internationalist (or redistributive) concept of aid. However
the International Development Act 2002 is largely indifferent to issues of
democracy in the delivery of aid. As Patrick McAuslan has observed, the
InternationalDevelopmentAct 2002 centralizes authority in the office of
the Secretary of State for International Development. It leaves most aid
decisions up to her discretion, and makes it more difficult for courts to
review these decisions.64
The International Development Act 2002 focuses on aid, and is silent
on other kinds of political-economic relations between North and
South. This limitation was vividly illustrated in 2002 when the
government of Tanzania sought to buy an air traffic control system from
the British company BAE Systems. From Clare Short's perspective, this
represented a wasteful use of money that should have been directed
toward poverty reduction. Short unsuccessfully tried to convince her
cabinet colleagues to block the sale. Defeated at the cabinet table, Short
"punished" the Tanzanian government by withholding £10 million in
promised aid.65
The Tanzanian air traffic control episode confirms Patrick
McAuslan's observations about centralized authority for aid funding
under the International Development Act 2002. However, McAuslan's
critique of the International Development Act 2002 also revealingly
illustrates the tensions among values within the development assistance
field. Although McAuslan is critical of the Secretary of State's centralized
authority, he stops short of calling for democratization. Instead, he calls
for more expert-led management. McAuslan argues that the
63 See Barder, supra note 56 at 21.
64 Patrick McAuslan, "The International Development Act, 2002: Benign Imperialism
or Missed Opportunity?" (2003) 66:4 Mod L Rev 563 at 583-85, 596.
65 Ibid at 597.
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International Development Act 2002 should have specified that British
aid would be conditional on recipient governments' commitment to
poverty reduction, good governance, and human rights." He explains:
Rather than just confer power on the Secretary of State to make
subjective judgments about whether the provision of any particular form
of development assistance will or will not contribute to a reduction in
poverty, the Act should have made much more explicit the basic ground
rules which will govern the provision and the withdrawal of assistance;
the criteria which will be taken into account in determining whether to
attach conditions to development assistance; and the duties of the
Secretary of State to be accountable to Parliament for the manner in
which assistance is provided and its effectiveness measured
and evaluated.7
McAuslan thus endorses the use of formal legal rules, but he sees
these rules largely as bases for disciplinary practices, as ways of
strengthening the UK government's bargaining power when it deals with
recalcitrant southern country governments. For government and critics
alike, then, the ends justify the means; poverty reduction is thought to
obviate concerns about power.
The United Kingdom's widely touted aid reforms prompted the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD)
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to examine the role of
donor country legislation in development assistance. In a 2005 report
entitled Managing Aid, the DAC noted that roughly half of its members
had legislated mandates for their aid programs, while half did not.68
Assessing the arguments for and against such legislation, the
DAC concluded:
6 Ibid at 587-95.
67 Ibid at 600 [emphasis in original].
68 OECD, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Managing Aid: Practices of DAC
Member Countries (Paris: OECD, 2005) at 24, online <www.oecd-library.org>
[OECD, Managing Aid].
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A well-developed legislative basis has the advantages of transparency and
of clarifying responsibilities among the various government entities that
may be involved, as well as establishing development objectives as the
main thrust of development co-operation for the whole system. On the
other hand, countries with a less formalised legal basis may have more
flexibility to act and this could be an advantage when trying to build
coalitions between development agencies and other government entities
whose policies and actions have an impact on development prospects in
developing countries.69
The DAC's ambivalence about legislation is symptomatic of a
managerial approach. The main significance of aid legislation appears to
be its ability to define the scope of the aid program vis-i-vis other
government functions. If legislation defines aid in terms of poverty
reduction or other "social" priorities, it may act as a firewall to protect
aid funds from being diverted for uses that have more to do with security
or commercial interests. The question, for the DAC, is whether donor
country legislation can help improve development assistance policies.
Nowhere is it asked whether law might have a role in clarifying
entitlements, rights, and obligations as between donors and recipients,
and whether such clarification might have an intrinsic value.
This managerial approach to donor countries' aid laws is all the more
remarkable when one considers how it coincided with renewed
prescriptions for law reform in recipient countries. During the 1990s, the
World Bank and other major donor institutions began to urge recipient
countries to reform their legal systems.70 This turn to law reform initially
reflected economic concerns, as the World Bank began to acknowledge
that markets (and market-led economic growth) depend on
69 Ibid.
-o See generally Thomas Carothers, "The Rule of Law Revival" (1998) 77:2 Foreign
Affairs 95; Yves Dezalay & Bryant G Garth, eds, Global Prescriptions: The
Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2002); David M Trubek, "The 'Rule of Law' in
Development Assistance: Past, Present and Future" in Trubek & Santos, supra note
36,74 [Trubek, "Rule of Law"].
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"governance" through laws and other institutions.71  Donors initially
focused on matters such as property law, contract law, and the
organization of courts-matters seen as fundamental to the "rule of law".
This new emphasis on legal institutions was thus founded on legal
formalism, albeit formalism instrumentalized in the name of
economic growth.72
Around the mid-1990s, this "governance" agenda converged with a
renewed emphasis on "social" concerns. In practical terms, economists
and social development advocates agreed on such matters as the
protection of civil and political rights, the independence of the judiciary,
and the elimination of corruption. The convergence of these agendas
had the effect of broadening the range of law reform programs; in the
late 1990s, the World Bank expanded its governance agenda to include
social issues such as gender equality, labour standards, and the
environment. But this convergence also helped to moderate the
social agenda.73
71 See Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank in A Changing World: Selected Essays
(Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991). The origins of such ideas can be
traced back to the work of Max Weber. See e.g. Max Rheinstein, ed, Max Weber on
Law in Economy and Society (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954) at 39-40. See
also David Trubek, "Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism" (1972) Wis L
Rev 720. In the early 1990s, they acquired new vigour thanks to the work of
Douglass North and other practitioners of the "new institutional economics", who
argued that the wealth or poverty of nations could be significantly attributed to the
qualities of their institutions, including the formal and informal laws governing
business practices. See e.g. Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change and
Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
n See Trubek, "Rule of Law", supra note 70 at 85-86. This legal formalism set it apart
from an earlier generation of law-and-development programs in the 1960s and
1970s. See generally David M Trubek & Marc Galanter, "Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in
the United States" (1974) Wis L Rev 1062.
7 See Kerry Rittich, "The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation
Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social" in Trubek & Santos, supra note 36,
203 [Rittich, "Second Generation Reforms"].
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Nevertheless, the legal certainty that donor agencies prescribed for
recipient countries stood in stark contrast to the managerial flexibility
that they sought to retain for themselves. There appears to have been an
almost complete disconnect between these two reform agendas. The
debates surrounding the donor countries' domestic aid reforms were
characterized by a lack of reflexivity about the law-and-development
agenda being promoted elsewhere.
3. THE ODAACCOUNTABILITYACT: GLOBALJUSTICE,
CANADIAN LAW
The ODA Accountability Act provides a case study in the use of domestic
law to respond to global issues. This Canadian statute, enacted in 2008,
stipulates that poverty reduction must be the primary purpose of
Canadian aid. As I explain in this part of the article, its creation was
initiated by a small group of activists associated with development
assistance NGOs. These activists hoped that legislation could help direct
Canadian aid toward social priorities such as health and education in the
global South. They imagined that Canadian aid could thus respond to
global injustices understood in terms of poverty and inequality.
In the following analysis, I note that most of the public debate
surrounding the ODA Accountability Act has recapitulated longstanding
disagreements about the proper purpose of aid. I show that, in spite of
the Act, the Harper government has emphasized the use of aid to pursue
Canadian interests. The government has, in effect, refused to see aid as a
response to global injustice. Nevertheless, the following analysis also
reveals the extent to which global justice advocates chose to promote
their goals through a managerial model of development assistance.
Moreover, this managerial model was assumed to obviate any concerns
about a democratic deficit.
The data in this case study is derived from a variety of documentary
sources, including legislation, parliamentary debates, government
reports, NGO advocacy materials, and newspaper articles. It is also
derived from two dozen semi-structured interviews. Between March and
September 2009, I interviewed 3 current or former members of
Parliament, 8 NGO staff members or volunteers, and 13 government
officials. I initially solicited interviews with people who had been
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publicly involved in the creation of the Act. I asked these participants to
recommend others, and I followed some of their leads. Most of the
interviews took place in Ottawa-Gatineau, at the offices of the
participants. I conducted telephone interviews in two cases where
arranging a face-to-face meeting proved impossible.
3.1 THE CONTEXT: CANADIAN AID INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES
Canada has provided development assistance to countries in the global
South for over 60 years.71 However, the governance of Canadian aid has
historically been rather informal. Until 2008, Canada had no legislation
specifying the purpose of its aid programs. Instead, as I explain in this
section, the allocation of aid (among countries and among types of
programs) has largely been a matter of ministerial and bureaucratic
discretion. I also explain how the unstructured nature of this discretion
has prompted social-democratic internationalists as well as liberal
internationalists to worry about the influence of commercial and security
priorities on aid decisions. Activists representing these perspectives have
therefore argued that Parliament should strengthen the legal framework
for aid.
Debates about Canadian aid policy, and about the potential role of
law in structuring aid decisions, have evolved in the context of a
particular institutional landscape. Within the federal government,
responsibility for development assistance has long been divided among a
number of departments and agencies. Debates about aid policy have
therefore sometimes taken the form of bureaucratic turf wars.7 1
7 See generally David R Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and
Canadian Development Assistance (Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier University
Press, 1998).
7 Ibid at 443-45. See also Cranford Pratt, "DFAIT's Takeover Bid of CIDA: The
Institutional Future of the Canadian International Development Agency" (1998)
5:2 Canadian Foreign Policy J 1; Stephen Brown, "CIDA under the Gun" in Jean
Daudelin & Daniel Schwanen, eds, Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room for
Manoeuvre? (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008) 91 at 93-95
[Brown, "CIDA under the Gun"].
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From 1968 to 2013, the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA) distributed the bulk of Canadian aid. In 2009-10, for
example, CIDA disbursed over $3.5 billion in official development
assistance, including $2.6 billion in bilateral aid.76 A 2009 report by the
Auditor General noted that CIDA had a staff of approximately 1,800
civil servants, including those at its headquarters in Gatineau as well as
those posted overseas.77 CIDA was represented in cabinet by the
Minister for International Cooperation.
A number of other Canadian government actors and institutions
have also played key roles in development assistance. Historically,
Canadian prime ministers have set the general direction of government
policy, including aid policy.78 The Department of Finance determines
the overall size of the aid budget. It is also responsible for Canadas
contributions to the Bretton Woods Institutions.7 9 The Department of
National Defence is closely involved in the delivery of Canadian aid in
conflict areas." The foreign ministry, known until recently as the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), has
historically overseen certain bilateral programs (in areas such as security
and post-conflict reconstruction) as well as Canada's relations with UN
7 CIDA, Report to Parliament on Canadas Official Development Assistance 2009-2010
(Gatineau: CIDA, 2010) at 2-7, online: <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca> [CIDA, 2009-10
Summary Report].
77 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2009 Fall Report of the Auditor
General of Canada to the House of Commons: Chapter 8: Strengthening
Aid Effectiveness- Canadian International Development Agency (Ottawa: Minister of
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2009) at 5,
online: <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca> [Auditor General 2009 Report on CIDA].
See Bernard Wood, "Managing Canada's Growing Development Cooperation: Out
of the Labyrinth" in Jennifer Welsh & Ngaire Woods, eds, Exporting Good
Governance: Temptations and Challenges in Canada's Aid Program (Waterloo, Ont:
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007) 225 at 242.
7 See Bretton Woods and Related Agreements Act, RSC 1985, c B-7.
so See CIDA, Report to Parliament on Canadas Official Development Assistance




agencies. A number of other government departments manage small,
sector-specific projects relating to security, health, or the environment.
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC), a Crown
corporation, funds research in developing countries, as well as research
collaboration between Canadian researchers and those in
developing countries."
Under these arrangements, CIDA was a separate bureaucratic entity,
but it was formally subordinate to DFAIT. CIDA had been established
by order-in-council, and it never had its own enabling statute. Its legal
mandate was primarily a function of the spending authority it received
each year in the annual Appropriation Acts-the budget. And the
standard budgetary formulation was extremely open-ended: CIDA was
empowered to provide grants, contributions, and payments "for
international development assistance, international humanitarian
assistance and other specified purposes."" Meanwhile, the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act granted the Minister of
Foreign Affairs "control and supervision" over CIDA. 4 This legislation
also specified that the role of the Minister for International
Cooperation-the minister responsible for CIDA-was "to assist the
s' Eight other government departments also reported ODA spending in the
government's 2008-09 Summary Report under the ODA Accountability Act.
Citizenship and Immigration spent $92 million on resettling refugees in Canada,
which is considered ODA under the DAC definition. The RCMP, the Departments
of National Defence, Health, Environment, Industry, and Parks each had an aid
budget of less than $20 million each, either for small bilateral projects or for
contributions to multilateral organizations. See ibid at 2.
82 A Crown corporation with its own enabling legislation, the IDRC is governed by a
board of directors and reports to Parliament through the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
See InternationalDevelopmentResearch CentreAct, RSC 1985, c 1-19.
83 See e.g. Bill C-49, An Act for granting to Her Majesty certain sums of money for the
federal public administration for the financial year ending March 31, 2010, 2nd Sess,
40th Parl, 2009 (as passed by the House of Commons 19 June 2009) at 21.
84 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act, RSC 1985,
c E-22, s 10(2)(f ).
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Minister [of foreign affairs] in carrying out the Minister's responsibilities
relating to the conduct of Canadas international relations."
In 2013, as part of an omnibus budget bill, the Harper government
legislated the merger of CIDA and DFAIT, establishing the Department
of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). The revised
legislation empowers the Minister of Foreign Affairs to "foster
sustainable international development and poverty reduction
in developing countries and provide humanitarian assistance
during crises."86  The Minister of International Cooperation has
been replaced by a Minister of International Development whose
role is "to assist the Minister in carrying out his or her responsibilities
relating to international development, poverty reduction and
humanitarian assistance."81
Since the 1950s, it has been widely understood that Canadian aid
programs serve a number of policy goals. As the Progressive
Conservative Member of Parliament J.M. Macdonnell put it in 1961:
First of all, there is the humanitarian argument. If these people were
going to bed hungry just across the road from us we would not go to bed
until we had done something about it. Second, there is the political
argument which is that it is tremendously in our interests, indeed, it is
vital to us, that these underdeveloped countries shall develop
economically under free institutions and not under communist
institutions. . . . Then there is the third argument, which some people
rather deprecate because it sounds as if we were doing it for our own
interests. I have no objection to doing something in our own interests as
long as it is in the interests of other people too."
Likewise, five years later, the political scientist Keith Spicer identified
Canadian aid as serving a "trinity" of "mixed motives": humanitarian,
political, and economic.9 In subsequent debates over Canadian aid
85 Ibid, s 4.
86 Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and DevelopmentAct, SC 2013, c 33, s 10(2)(f).
1 Ibid, s 4.




policy, the pursuit of economic development and poverty reduction have
often been contrasted with the pursuit of Canadian commercial and
security interests. Debates about aid policy have generally concerned the
relative priority to be accorded to these goals.
Among Canadian government institutions, CIDA was most closely
associated with the pursuit of economic development and poverty
reduction. Other departments have had other priorities. The foreign
ministry's priority has generally been the pursuit of Canadian national
interests, often understood in terms of security or trade. Some
departments have sought subsidies for favoured firms or industries.
Because CIDA had discretionary spending authority over a large amount
of money, ministers and officials from other departments often sought o
influence how CIDA's money was spent."
Liberal and social-democratic internationalists, seeking to protect
CIDA's priorities, therefore argued for many years that CIDA needed a
stronger legal mandate-one that would enable it to resist these
intragovernmental pressures. In 1987, a House of Commons committee
called for legislation declaring that "[t]he primary purpose of Canadian
official development assistance is to help the poorest countries and
people in the world" and that "development priorities" must prevail over
"other important foreign policy objectives."9 ' This call for legislation was
repeated in 1995 by a parliamentary Special Joint Committee.92 Finally,
in 2007, a Senate Committee chaired by Hugh Segal issued a report
containing a scathing critique of Canadian policies toward Africa, largely
informed by liberal internationalist principles. This report
90 See Morrison, supra note 74 at 443-45; Wood, supra note 78.
9 House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International
Trade, For Whose Benefit? Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and
International Trade on Canadas Official Development Assistance Policies and
Programs (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1987) at 12.
92 See Morrison, supra note 74 at 388, 395.
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recommended that CIDA either be abolished or given a clear
statutory mandate.
3.2 THE CREATION OF THE ODA ACCOUNTABILITYACT
The ODA Accountability Act emerged from this tradition of liberal
internationalist and social-democratic internationalist advocacy. It was
championed by people who imagined aid as a response to global
injustices. Nevertheless, almost all of the participants in the legislative
process were Canadian. There was no direct participation from the
global South. To the extent that one imagines aid as linked to global
justice, the legislative process therefore involved a democratic deficit.
The Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) led
the movement for the ODA Accountability Act. Established in 1968, the
CCIC is the principal coalition of Canadian NGOs involved in
development assistance. It has approximately 75 member organizations,
including Canadian chapters of large international NGOs, local
community initiatives, religious groups, and labour unions.'
The CCIC's then President-CEO, Gerry Barr, played a key role in
the legislative process. The CCIC also enlisted several legally-trained
individuals to help draft the legislation. Among these drafters was Vicky
Edgecombe, a law student at the University of Ottawa who had written a
paper comparing other donor countries' legislation. Vicky Edgecombe's
research focused on the International Development Act 2002 as a
"starting point for crafting Canadian legislation."'
Many of the drafters of the ODA Accountability Act would have liked
to see Parliament enact a comprehensive enabling statute for CIDA. 96
9 Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Overcoming 40 Years ofFailure: A New Road Map for Sub-Saharan Afica (February
2007) (Chair: The Honourable Hugh Segal), online: <www.parl.gc.ca>.
94 CCIC, "Members", online: <www.ccic.ca>.
9 Vicky Edgecombe, "Establishing a Legal Basis for Canada's Official Development
Assistance" (12 January 2005), online: Hon John McKay PC, MP
<www.johnmckaymp.on.ca>.
96 Interview of an NGO-affiliated proponent of the Act (24 March 2009).
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The ideal legislation imagined by many of the Act's proponents would
have defined CIDA's mandate in terms of poverty reduction, established
CIDA's institutional independence, and guaranteed CIDA a stable (and
increasing) level of funding.7 However, after informal consultations
with sympathetic members of Parliament, the CCIC concluded that
only the first of these three was likely to win the support of a
parliamentary majority.8 The CCIC therefore drafted a bill centred on
the requirement that Canadian aid be used for the purpose of poverty
reduction, obliging the government to report to Parliament on its
compliance with this objective. In its original version, the CCIC's bill
would also have required the Minister of International Cooperation to
appoint an advisory committee, including representatives from NGOs,
religious organizations, the private sector, and Parliament.
The opportunity to introduce this legislation arose out of a
confluence of domestic and international events. Domestically, a divided
Parliament made it possible for individual parliamentarians to succeed
with idiosyncratic legislative projects.100 Internationally, in 2005, an
NGO-led "Global Call to Action Against Poverty" and the G8 summit
in Gleneagles, Scotland created a wave of publicity for aid issues. As a
consequence, the three Parliamentary opposition leaders (including
Stephen Harper) signed an open letter calling on Prime Minister Paul
Martin to increase aid levels and to introduce aid legislation.01 In June
9 Interview of an NGO-affiliated proponent of the Act (26 March 2009).
98 Ibid.
9 Bill C-293, An Act respecting the provision of'development assistance abroad, 1st Sess,
39th Parl, 2006, cl 6 (first reading, 17 May 2006).
100 From 2004 to 2006, Paul Martin's Liberal Party held a plurality but not a majority of
seats in Parliament. In 2006, Stephen Harper's Conservative Party was elected, but
remained short of a parliamentary majority until 2011.
'0' See Jeff Sallot, "Opposition Unites around Foreign Aid', The Globe and Mail
(19 February 2005) A4.
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2005, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
and International Trade reiterated these recommendations.102
The CCIC approached several members of Parliament, asking them
to sponsor its legislation as a private member's bill. Four private
member's bills based on the CCIC's model were introduced in 2005 and
2006.10 The version that would ultimately pass was introduced as
Bill C-293 on 17 May 2006 by John McKay, a member of the Liberal
Party (by this point in opposition). McKay had practised real estate law
in Scarborough, Ontario before entering politics in 1997. "One can
infer from his professional history that McKay's main exposure to aid
issues came from his experience as Parliamentary Secretary to the
Minister of Finance from 2003 to 2006. 10 On my reading, McKay's own
views on aid mingled liberal internationalism with Christian
(Baptist) humanitarianism.
Bill C-293 was initially supported by the opposition Liberals, New
Democrats, and the Bloc Quabicois, but opposed by Prime Minister
Stephen Harper's Conservative minority government. The proponents'
choice of a title for Bill C-293 was strategic. They used the word
"accountability" to mirror the Conservative party's political rhetoric and
to shame the government into supporting it.1o5
102 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Report 12-InternationalAid, 38th Parl, 1st Sess (9 June 2005).
13 Bill C-446, An Act respecting the provision ofdevelopment assistance by the Canadian
International Development Agency and other federal bodies, 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2005
(first reading, 16 November 2005); Bill C-204, An Act respecting the provision of
development assistance by the Canadian International Development Agency and other
federal bodies, 1st Sess, 39th Parl, 2006 (first reading, 6 April 2006); Bill C-243, An
Act respecting the provision of development assistance by the Canadian International
Development Agency and other federal bodies, 1st Sess, 39th Parl, 2006 (first reading,
1 May 2006); Bill C-293, supra note 99.
104 See John McKay, Biography, "Hon John McKay, MP", online:
<www.johnmckaymp.on.ca>.
10 Interview of an NGO-affiliated proponent of the Act (24 March 2009). Compare
FederalAccountability Act, SC 2006, c 9.
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During the Bill's passage through the House of Commons, the
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development
amended the bill to remove certain features that would have required
fiscal allocations, and thus could not have proceeded without
government support.0 6 Most importantly, the provisions for an advisory
committee and a petition process were replaced with consultation
requirements. With the support of the three opposition parties,
Bill C-293 passed its third reading in the House of Commons
on 28 March 2007.
The Senate then spent over a year debating Bill C-293. The main
protagonists in the Senate were Liberal Senator Romeo Dallaire and
Conservative Senator Hugh Segal. Dallaire, famous for his experience as
a UN peacekeeper in Rwanda, had later become an advocate for
humanitarian intervention in Darfur. Segal, as I have mentioned, had
chaired a Senate committee that had produced a highly critical report on
Canadian aid to Africa. Although Segal and his Conservative colleagues
initially opposed the bill, they relented after the Liberals agreed to
certain amendments: the insertion of a reference to the Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness, more modest consultation requirements, and a
provision ensuring the confidentiality of discussions at the
Bretton Woods Institutions. The Senate passed the amended Bill C-293
on 16 April 2008. The amended bill received unanimous approval from
the House of Commons shortly thereafter and came into force
on 30 June 2008.
The legislative process that led to the ODA Accountability Act was
thus almost exclusively a Canadian affair. The core group of activists who
put forward the Act was entirely composed of Canadians. Certainly,
these activists had numerous personal and professional ties to the global
South, and their ideas on global justice were informed by these
commitments. However, no one from the global South testified during
106 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 54, reprinted in RSC 1985,
Appendix II, No 5. For a more detailed explanation in reference to an analogous
situation, see Richard Janda, "An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the
Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing Countries (Bill C-300): Anatomy of
a Failed Initiative" (2010) 6:2JSDLP 97 at 100.
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the parliamentary committee hearings or debated the merits of the Act
in other public fora. If people from the global South-the intended
beneficiaries of the Act-played any role in the legislative process, it was
at best highly indirect.
3.3 THE LEGISLATIVE TEXT
The text of the ODA Accountability Act begins by declaring poverty
reduction to be the "focus" of Canadian aid:
2. (1) The purpose of this Act is to ensure that all Canadian official
development assistance abroad is provided with a central focus on
poverty reduction and in a manner that is consistent with Canadian
values, Canadian foreign policy, the principles of the Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness of March 2, 2005, sustainable development and
democracy promotion and that promotes international human
rights standards.
The Act's main substantive provisions, subsections 4(1) and 4(1.1),
are also concerned with the purpose of aid. These provisions stipulate
that ministers responsible for providing aid must be satisfied that this aid
meets certain conditions:
4. (1) Official development assistance may be provided only if the
competent minister is of the opinion that it
(a) contributes to poverty reduction;
(b) takes into account the perspectives of the poor; and
(c) is consistent with international human rights standards.
(1.1) Notwithstanding subsection (1), official development assistance
may be provided for the purposes of alleviating the effects of a natural or
artificial disaster or other emergency occurring outside Canada.
The consequences of a failure to meet these criteria are found in
subsection 4(3), which states:
(3) In calculating Canada's official development assistance
contribution in Government of Canada publications, the competent
minister or the Governor in Council shall consider only official
development assistance as defined by this Act that meets the criteria in
subsections (1) and (1.1).
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In other words, the Canadian government can still fund projects that do
not contribute to poverty reduction, etcetera, but it can no longer refer
to them as "official development assistance" in its publications.
It is worth noting that the Act contains a circularity. The limits set by
section 4 only apply to "official development assistance", which is a term
defined to mean international assistance that meets the criteria set out in
section 4. Section 3 of the Act states that:
"official development assistance" means international assistance
(a) that is administered with the principal objective of promoting the
economic development and welfare of developing countries, that is
concessional in character, that conveys a grant element of at least 25%,
and that meets the requirements set out in section 4; or
(b) that is provided for the purpose of alleviating the effects of a natural
or artificial disaster or other emergency occurring outside Canada.
The remaining provisions of the Act have to do with consultation
and reporting. Subsection 4(2) specifies that the ministerial opinion
cannot arise in a vacuum, but must be the result of consultations with
certain groups:
(2) The competent minister shall consult with governments,
international agencies and Canadian civil society organizations at least
once every two years, and shall take their views and recommendations
into consideration when forming an opinion described
in subsection (1).
Section 5 of the Act requires ministers to submit two reports to
Parliament each year. Subsection 5(1) sets out the requirements for the
first of these reports, unofficially known as a summary report, due six
months after the end of each fiscal year (i.e., 30 September). In this
document, each department must state the total amount of its aid
disbursements and provide "a summary of any activity or initiative taken
under this Act". Subsection 5(2) requires the government to provide a
full statistical account of Canadian aid one year after the end of each
fiscal year (31 March).
Finally, the ODA Accountability Act also deals with the Canadian
government's participation in international donor institutions.
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Subsection 5(3) requires the Minister of Finance to disclose "the
position taken by Canada on any resolution that is adopted by the Board
of Governors of the Bretton Woods Institutions", and to justify Canada's
activities vis-i-vis the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) in terms of the
substantive values of the ODA Accountability Act. However, these
obligations are qualified by subsection 5(4), which guarantees the
confidentiality of discussions held at the BWIs.
3.4 THE INTENTIONS OF THE PROPONENTS
The proponents of the ODA Accountability Act intended it to mandate a
social approach to aid policy, with some concessions to an economic
approach. Above all, they intended it to exclude the use of aid for the
pursuit of Canadian commercial and security interests. However, the
proponents of the Act also looked to managerialism as the best way to
pursue these policy goals. In effect, the design of the ODA Accountability
Act reveals its proponents' faith in managerial, expert-led governance.
From the proponents' perspective, the lynchpin of the
ODA Accountability Act is paragraph 4 (1)(a), which requires Canadian
aid to be focused on poverty reduction. Poverty reduction is also given
top billing in the Act's statement of purpose. Some proponents of
the Act understood poverty reduction in "social" terms, linking it to
the provision of social services such as "clean wells" and "schools for
kids".107 Others linked poverty reduction to economic development.
Several expressed hope that the emphasis on poverty reduction would
help to exclude certain forms of aid, most notably security-related forms
of aid such as those linked to the NATO campaign in Afghanistan.os
Some proponents also argued that "tied" aid, or the use of aid to
promote Canadian commercial objectives, would be prohibited under
107 Interview of an NGO-affiliated proponent of the Act (26 March 2009).
108 Interview of an NGO-affiliated proponent of the Act (24 March 2009); interview of
an NGO-affiliated proponent of the Act (24 March 2009); interview of an
NGO-affiliated proponent of the Act (17 August 2009).
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the Act.o' As John McKay put it, the Act was meant to "protect
development money from being redirected towards Canadian security
projects and business interests and from ever changing 'flavour of the
week' policies."110
However, the proponents of the Act also chose to entrust the
application of this requirement to the minister responsible for providing
aid. The test provided in subsection 4 (1) is entirely subjective. Provided
that "the competent minister" has formed an opinion that the aid in
question would contribute to poverty reduction, it would be almost
impossible to challenge the minister's decision. Moreover, subsection
4(1) stops short of demanding that the minister allocate aid on the basis
of need. The minister is not required to select the aid policy or program
that would reduce poverty the most. The Act only deals with one aid
allocation decision at a time. An aid policy or program could reduce
poverty only minimally or incidentally and still be considered acceptable
under the Act. In addition, section 1.1, which sets aside the poverty
reduction requirement in cases of disaster relief, could also be construed
to allow ministers to provide aid for a wide variety of other purposes.
Why, then, did its proponents imagine that such a mechanism would
help to further their approach to aid policy? The answer is that they had
faith in an expert-led model of development assistance, which they
associated with CIDA. They saw CIDA, an institution staffed by
development experts, as the government actor most likely to share their
vision of development assistance and of global justice. They identified
other government departments, such as Foreign Affairs and Finance, as
the main threats. Reliance on ministerial judgment was meant to insulate
CIDA from intragovernmental political pressures.' The Act's
proponents deliberately avoided stipulating objective criteria, because
109 Interview of an NGO-affiliated proponent of the Act (31 March 2009).
110 John McKay, News Release, "Liberal MP McKay Calls on Conservative Government
to Stand Up for Poverty Reduction" (20 September 2006),
online: <www.johnmckaynp.on.ca>.
Interview of a Member of Parliament (18 March 2009); Interview of an
NGO-affiliated proponent of the Act (20 March 2009).
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they did not want to hamper the flexibility of aid practices, especially
those of CIDA.
It must be acknowledged that the proponents of the Act were fully
aware of the subjective nature of the criteria in subsection 4(1) and of the
ambiguity of terms like "poverty reduction". They therefore
accompanied this substantive requirement with processes that they
hoped would help ensure the government's fidelity to a "social" approach
to development. Foremost among these is the "perspectives of the poor"
requirement in paragraph 4(1)(b). This provision lends weight to a
"social" interpretation of poverty reduction, while hinting at the
democratization of aid processes. Thus, according to the CCIC,
paragraph 4(1)(b) means that "Canadian ODA must be delivered in a
manner that builds capacities of affected populations to participate in all
dimensions of development affecting their lives".112
Likewise, the Act's proponents described its consultation and
reporting requirements as ways of increasing transparency and public
participation in aid delivery. By stipulating that CIDA (and other
departments) must engage in consultations, the proponents of the Act
sought to enlist a wider constituency-including non-governmental
actors-in the project of interpreting the legislation. They imagined an
alternative community of interpretation for the Act that would help fend
off pressures coming from elsewhere in government.' As I have noted,
the Act's proponents understood the consultation requirements as a
substitute for their preferred option, an advisory committee representing
various stakeholder groups. In the original version of the Bill, this
committee would have been able to receive petitions from
developing-country residents, should they wish to complain that
Canadian aid was inconsistent with the purposes of the Act.
The committee would have decided whether to forward these petitions
112 Brian Tomlinson, "International Human Rights Standards and Canadian ODA:
Implications and Issues of the Canadian ODA Accountability Act: A CCIC
Briefing Note" (November 2008) at 19, online: CCIC <www.ccic.ca> [Tomlinson,
"Implications and Issues"].
113 Interview of an NGO-affiliated proponent of the Act (20 March 2009).
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to the minister; if it had done so, the minister would have been
obliged to respond."
The Act's consultation and reporting requirements, as well as the
"perspectives of the poor" requirement, were meant to involve a wider
constituency in aid policy making and enhance the transparency of aid
decisions. However, these provisions cannot be said to bring about a true
democratization of aid. Even in the hoped-for petition process, the role
of Canadian constituencies would have been much more powerful than
that of poor people in the global South. As enacted, the law mainly
provides for accountability toward Canadians. The government must
report to the Canadian Parliament. It must consult with "governments,
international agencies and Canadian civil society organizations"'"-but
not necessarily with civil society organizations in recipient countries, nor
with aid recipients themselves. And the government has the last word.
During the parliamentary hearings, when Senator Raynell Andreychuk
suggested that the consultation requirements in subsection 4(3) should
include the poor, John McKay replied, "Senator Andreychuk you argued
that it should be a right of the poor to have their perspectives taken into
account. That is a bridge too far. This is still the discretion of the
Canadian people as represented by their minister and government." 16
The limited democratization imagined by the Act's proponents, their
modest use of accountability mechanisms, is essentially consistent with
standard models of "participatory development" (see Part 2.1, above).
Moreover, for the Act's proponents, these procedural mechanisms were
meant to buttress a particular substantive vision of aid. The proponents'
vision of global justice was thus one in which expert managers would
pursue a modest form of redistribution, but not necessarily one in which
those who were to benefit from this redistribution would have a loud
114 See Bill C-293, supra note 99, cl 6-8. It is interesting to compare this imagined
petition process with the process that existed under the League of Nations mandate
system. See Rajagopal, supra note 50 at 67-71.
" ODA Accountability Act, supra note 2, s 4 (2).
116 Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Proceedings (June 2007) at 24 (Chair: John McKay).
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voice. Although the proponents of the Act hoped to respond to justice
claims coming from outside Canada, they were content to allow
Canadian institutions to decide how to respond to these claims, on the
basis of their superior expertise.
On the whole, the proponents of the Act placed their trust in
bureaucratic discretion, hoping that this discretion could be infused with
values similar to their own. In this regard, it is revealing that, despite
their objections to the government's subsequent policy changes, the
proponents have generally refrained from accusing the government of
breaking the law. Instead, they have argued that the government is
violating the "spirit" of the law or failing to implement it properly.1 17 One
proponent of the Act expressed the view that Canadian development
NGOs would prefer to avoid litigation, because it might lead to an
overly precise interpretation of the Act."'
3.5 THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
The government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper initially opposed
Bill C-293. However, it later relented, and tepidly endorsed the bill. The
amendments secured by Senator Hugh Segal, discussed earlier, facilitated
this about-face. But so did the government's realization that the terms of
the ODA Accountability Act could be interpreted to be consistent with its
policy preferences: economic development and the pursuit of Canadian
commercial and security interests. To the dismay of the Act's proponents,
the Harper government has adopted an international-realist approach to
aid, and it has interpreted the Act to be consistent with
such an approach.
Before proceeding with this analysis, it is important to acknowledge
that "the government" is not monolithic. A wide range of views on aid
policy can be found among Canadian government officials. In particular,
I1 See Gerry Barr, "ODA Accountability Act: Remarkable Legislation, Disappointing
Implementation" in CCIC, A Time to Act: Implementing the ODA Accountability
Act: A Canadian CSO Agenda for Aid ReJbrm (Ottawa: CCIC, 2010) 5 at 12,
online: <www.ccic.ca> [CCIC, Time to Act].
" Interview of an NGO-affiliated proponent of the Act (24 March 2009).
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the views of development bureaucrats are not necessarily the same as
those of the political leadership. However, for the sake of convenience, I
refer to the position of "the government" when summarizing the general
policy direction adopted by the Harper cabinet. I specify particular
governmental actors where it is necessary to explain divergences.
While Bill C-293 was being debated in Parliament, the new
government's approach to aid policy remained unclear. The government's
foreign policy was focused on the war in Afghanistan; with regard to aid,
it emphasized the integration of aid into the war effort as part of a "3-D"
or "whole of government" approach."9 However, after the Act came into
force, the government introduced further policy changes reflecting a
concern for the pursuit of Canadian commercial and security interests,
the projection of conservative moral values, and to some extent,
economic development. And it introduced these policy changes without
any explicit reference to the ODA AccountabilityAct.12 0
For example, in February 2009, CIDA announced that its previous
list of 25 "countries of concentration" would be narrowed to 20
"countries of focus".121 The number of African countries on the list was
halved, whereas Latin American countries were added.1 2 2 This shift was
widely regarded as motivated by Canadian commercial and security
interests. An aide to Minister for International Cooperation Beverley J.
Oda called the decision "a function of need, of the capacity to deliver aid
119 See Brown, "CIDA under the Gun', supra note 75; Erin Simpson, "From
Inter-Dependence to Conflation: Security and Development in the Post-9/11 Era"
(2007) 28:2 Can J Development Studies 263.
120 See Stephen Brown, "Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid
Initiatives" in Stephen Brown, ed, Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian
Foreign Aid (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012) 79 at 97-98
[Brown, "Aid Effectiveness"] [Brown, Strugglingfor Effectiveness].
121 See ibid.
122 See CIDA, News Release, "Canada Moves on Another Element of its Aid
Effectiveness Agenda" (23 February 2009), online: <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca>.
488 VOL 48:2
2015 GLOBAL JUSTICE AND MANAGERIALISM
effectively, and supporting Canada's foreign policy".123 One country
added to the list was Colombia; at the time of the announcement, the
government was seeking parliamentary approval for a new bilateral trade
agreement with Colombia.
In May 2009, Minister Oda announced that CIDA's work would
henceforth focus on the themes of "food security," "sustainable economic
growth:' and "children and youth."24 Later, "security and stability" and
"democracy" were added.125 In January 2010, Prime Minister Stephen
Harper announced that he would use Canada's hosting of the 2010 G8
and G20 summits to promote maternal and child health in developing
countries-but categorically declared that Canadian funds would not be
used to provide access to abortion.126
In November 2012, new CIDA minister Julian Fantino confirmed a
shift in policy toward "partnership" with the private sector. He cited
examples of education projects operating alongside Canadian mining
companies. He also spoke of aid as a way of opening markets for
Canadian firms, declaring, "CIDA takes an upstream approach to
economic growth. We help to make countries and people, trade and
investment ready."1 27 Fantino also underlined the ongoing relevance of
security goals, stating that aid "safeguards Canadian security by
123 Clark Campbell, "Canada Seeks Strategic Ties by Focusing Aid on Americas',
The Globe and Mail (23 February 2009) A13.
124 CIDA, "A New Effective Approach to Canadian Aid: Speaking Notes for
the Honourable Beverley J. Oda Minister of International Cooperation at the
Munk Centre for International Studies", online: <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca>
[Oda Toronto Speech].
See CIDA, 2009-10 Summary Report, supra note 76 at 5.
126 See e.g. Joanna Smith, "No Support for Funding Abortion: PM Harper Says
Canadians Don't Want to Be Split Over Use of Foreign Aid', Toronto Star
(28 April 2010) A10.
7 CIDA, "Minister Fantino's Keynote Address to the Economic Club of




addressing sources of instability and preventing threats before they reach
our borders".128
The absorption of CIDA by the foreign ministry in 2013 thus
consummated a gradual policy shift. In general, the Harper government
has seen aid as a way of pursuing Canadian commercial and security
goals. The government accepts that aid can help support economic
development, although it tends to prioritize countries where Canada has
strategic interests. The government sometimes uses the language of
charity or generosity to describe Canadian aid commitments, but never
the language of moral obligation.
The government's approach to the interpretation of the ODA
Accountability Act reflects this international-realist policy orientation.
The government has responded to the "poverty reduction" requirement
in paragraph 4 (1)(a) in two ways. On one hand, it has argued for an
economic rather than a social understanding of this requirement,
maintaining that economic growth is the means to reduce poverty.
Second, it has often simply minimized the significance of this
requirement, or emphasized its vagueness and open-endedness. In
interviews, some officials emphasized that poverty reduction should
include both "direct" and "indirect" approaches.1 2 9 One referred to
poverty reduction as a "comprehensive concept" that can include
economic growth, education, health, or justice sector reform.30 Some
specified that poverty reduction should also be understood to include
security-related aid and peacekeeping.3 ' According to one official,
poverty reduction is merely a "semantic game : one can argue that
anything does or does not reduce poverty.132 Generally, CIDA officials
128 Ibid.
129 Interview of a government official (24 June 2009).
130 Interview of a government official (28 September 2009).
131 Interview of a government official (20 May 2009).
132 Interview of a government official (19 May 2009).
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took the position that the poverty reduction provisions merely
confirmed CIDA's existing priorities.1 3 3
The government's first four summary reports under the Act reflect
both of these approaches to poverty reduction. These documents
describe the kinds of aid provided in the previous fiscal year, implying
that ministers are of the opinion that these contribute to poverty
reduction. But few reasons are given for these opinions; contributions to
poverty reduction are generally asserted rather than explained or
justified. For example, the word "poverty" appears only twice in CIDA's
section of the first summary report, once as part of the blanket assertion
that "CIDA supports programs and projects with poverty reduction as
their primary objective." 3 ' The second, third, and fourth summary
reports contain more references to poverty, but for CIDA, poverty was
increasingly subsumed under the heading of "sustainable economic
growth". Interestingly, the fifth summary report, covering CIDA's final
year as a separate entity, places a greater emphasis on poverty reduction
as an overarching theme.3 5
Other departments have been even more explicit about their
economic approach to poverty reduction. For example, the Department
of Finance argues that debt relief for poor countries reduces poverty by
freeing up resources "for use in more productive investments
(e.g., health, education, infrastructure, etc.) that support long-term
economic growth and development."' 36 DFAIT argued that its program
of scholarships for foreign students "contributes to poverty reduction by
developing a skilled workforce, leading to economic growth and
development" and that its Investment Cooperation Program "supports
3 CIDA, "ODA Accountability Act Implementation Steering Committee
(29 October 2008): Record of Discussion" [on file with author].
134 CIDA, 2008-09 Summary Report, supra note 80 at 3.
135 Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), Report to
Parliament on the Government of Canada's Official Development Assistance
2012-2013 (Ottawa: DFTAD, 2013), online: <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca> [DFATD,
2012-13 Summary Report].
131 CIDA, 2009-10 Summary Report, supra note 76 at 11.
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responsible, developmentally beneficial, private sector investments in
developing countries leading to sustained economic growth and
poverty reduction."3 7
Government officials have also adopted a minimal, procedural
reading of the "perspectives of the poor" requirement. The government
has generally taken a position that its practices were always compliant
with the Act. Indeed, internal discussions at CIDA focused on
documenting the fact that the perspectives of the poor have been
ascertained."' In a document released shortly after the Act came into
force, CIDA declared:
CIDA has long considered the perspectives of the poor as part of its
normal design and management processes. Officials typically have used a
range of options to gather the perspectives of the poor for international
assistance activities. The options may include: reviews of relevant
research material, reports from other donor organizations, site visits,
consultations with the intended recipients, relevant civil society
organizations, individuals with particular expertise, or with officials of
democratically elected partner governments. In order to demonstrate
compliance with the Act, the perspectives of the poor that are taken into
account via these mechanisms should be documented as appropriate.39
The government's first summary report under the Act contained no
references whatsoever to the perspectives of the poor. The second
summary report contained a single reference, in which CIDA asserted
that it takes into account the perspectives of the poor through "[a]
variety of formal and informal processes . . . such as consultations with
local partners and beneficiaries, participatory approaches, project review
processes and policy dialogue."' In the third report, CIDA simply
stated that each of its substantive programming themes "is linked to
'3 Ibid at 16.
13s See CIDA, "ODA Accountability Act Implementation Steering Committee
(29 October 2008): Record of Discussion" [on file with author].
3 CIDA, "CIDA's Business Process RoadMap version 3.3 (July 2008)" [on file with
author]. This paragraph was dropped from subsequent versions of this document.
140 CIDA, 2009-10 Summary Report, supra note 76 at 3.
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poverty reduction and takes into account the perspectives of the poor.""'
The fourth report merely acknowledged that taking into account the
perspectives of the poor is a requirement of the act. 2 The fifth report
repeated this acknowledgment, while adding (in a passage discussing a
contribution by the Department of Finance to the Catalyst Fund
managed by the World Bank's International Finance Corporation) that
the International Finance Corporation's investment objectives "broadly
respect the spirit of the Act regarding poverty reduction, perspectives of
the poor, and human rights."1 3
The government has also taken a narrower, more formal view of the
Act's reporting and consultation requirements. CIDA was already in the
habit of publishing a number of annual reports, including a detailed
annual statistical report. CIDA officials therefore seized on the Act's
reporting requirements as a public relations opportunity.14 The
government's first five summary reports have been remarkably
user-friendly documents, providing quantitative information about
Canadian aid while also supplying a sense of background and context for
aid projects-something that was often missing from CIDA's previous
annual statistical reports.
Government departments have also adopted a minimal reading of the
Act's consultation requirements. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
CIDA's practices of consulting with NGOs have in fact declined in
recent years. Indeed, shortly after the Act came into force, CIDA
141 CIDA, Report to Parliament on the Government of Canada's Official Development
Assistance 2010-2011 (Gatineau: CIDA, 2011), online: <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca>
[CIDA, 2010-11 Summary Report] at 3.
142 CIDA, Report to Parliament on the Government of Canadas Official Development
Assistance 2011-2012 (Gatineau: CIDA, 2012), online: <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca>
[CIDA, 2011-12 Summary Report] at 1.
143 DFATD, 2012-13 Summary Report, supra note 135.
1 Interview of a government official (19 May 2009).
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adopted a more directive stance toward the NGOs it helps to fund." ' In
November 2009, CIDA terminated its funding of Kairos, a
church-based NGO that had supported civil society groups in many
southern countries. Officially, CIDA merely stated that Kairos's work no
longer fit with its programming priorities. But unofficially, the
government made it clear that Kairos had been singled out for its
(allegedly) critical stance toward Israeli policies."' Over the next few
months, government officials directly or indirectly warned other NGOs
that their advocacy activities might cost them their CIDA funding."' In
2010, after 40 years of continuous funding, CIDA cut off its support
for the CCIC."
The proponents of the Act had hoped that "poverty reduction", left
in the hands of expert managers, would dictate a social approach to
development. But the government's response showed that this concept
could be rendered compatible with a national interests-based aid policy.
The proponents of the Act had also hoped that "the perspectives of the
poor" and procedural requirements could be imbued with substance. But
the government's response showed that such provisions could also be
treated as pure formalities. On the whole, the government's
interpretation and implementation of the Act showed that the
145 See Stephen Brown, "CIDA's New Partnership with Canadian NGOs: Modernizing
for Greater Effectiveness?" in Brown, Struggling for Effectiveness,
supra note 120, 287.
146 Speaking at a conference in Jerusalem in December 2009, Immigration Minister
Jason Kenney said that the government had cut Kairos's funding because of its
alleged involvement in a campaign to boycott Israel. See Jeff Davis, "Kenney's
Combative Christmas", Embassy (6 January 2010) 2. It was later revealed that,
despite her earlier parliamentary denials, Oda had flouted the advice of her own
officials in deciding to "de-fund" Kairos. See Bill Curry & Gloria Galloway, "Oda
Admits to Changing Memo, Harper Tories Accused of Secrecy", The Globe and Mail
(15 February 2011) Al.
'4 See Clark Campbell, "Aid Groups Told to Keep Quiet on Policy Issues', The Globe
and Mail (12 February 2010) A4.
1 See Lee Berthiaume, "Cutting Out the Development NGO 'Heart" Embassy
(9 June 2010) 1.
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managerial approaches of the Act's proponents could not withstand an
open political repudiation. The political leadership looked askance at the
professional sensibilities of the experts and managers on which the
proponents of the Act had pinned their hopes, and the Act contained
nothing that would constrain the government's policy direction. In this
regard, it is telling that, although the Harper Conservatives have held a
parliamentary majority since 2011, their government has never publicly
raised the possibility of amending or repealing the Act.
4. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS IN THE
ODAACCOUNTABILITYACT
The ODA Accountability Act contains references to a number of
international norms and standards. These include the reference, in the
preamble, to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; the reference to
"international human rights standards" in paragraph 4(1)(c); and the
Act's definition of "official development assistance", which is adapted
from the definition used by the OECD's Development Assistance
Committee. Although the Act was made in Canada, it contains a
number of imported parts.
It might be argued that such international references mitigate any
democratic deficit vis-i-vis people beyond Canada's borders. It might
also be argued that the legal qualities of some of these norms and
standards, especially human rights, serve to alleviate the Act's tendencies
toward managerialism. However, neither of these arguments withstands
closer scrutiny. First, the institutions that have generated such norms and
standards often suffer from democratic deficits-they are not
representative of the people aid is meant to help. Second, despite some
gestures toward democratization, the norms and standards contained in
the Act, including human rights, may be interpreted as consistent with a
managerial approach to aid.
Indeed, the proponents of the ODA Accountability Act recognized, to
some extent, the democratic shortcomings of aid institutions and of the
norms and standards they generate. As I explain in this part of the article,
the original version of the Act contained a number of provisions that
implicitly criticized such institutions, by requiring the government to
report on its activities at the Bretton Woods Institutions, and by
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attempting to redefine "official development assistance". However,
during the parliamentary process, these critical provisions were
effectively neutralized. The Act now reflects a largely deferential stance
toward the global governance of development assistance.
4.1 DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS AND MANAGERIALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL AID ORGANIZATIONS
The ODA Accountability Act contains a number of references to norms
and standards developed outside Canada. However, these norms and
standards do not necessarily enhance the Act's claim to be a mechanism
for the pursuit of global justice. This is because the institutions that have
generated these standards are not democratically governed. It is also
because these standards tend to be interpreted in keeping with a
managerial approach to development assistance.
It is widely acknowledged that bilateral aid may serve the interests of
the donor country in addition to, or at the expense of, the interests of the
recipient country. In contrast, multilateral aid, that is, aid managed by
international organizations, is sometimes portrayed as more
neutral-less politicized."' In practice, however, bilateral and
multilateral aid are not clearly separated; national aid agencies often
work in close collaboration with international organizations. As the
Auditor General of Canada put it in 2009 with reference to CIDA:
CIDA does not act alone. It is part of a larger development community,
globally and at a country-specific level-a community that also
influences CIDA's programming. This community includes aid agencies
from other donor countries, development banks, United Nations and
other multilateral institutions, civil society and nongovernment
organizations, and the governments of recipient countries.1 50
Moreover, despite aspirations toward neutrality, the governance
structures of the international organizations that deal with development
149 See e.g. Commission on International Development, Partners in Development:
Report ofthe Commission on International Development (London: Pall Mall, 1969).
150 Auditor General 2009 Report on CIDA, supra note 77 at 8.
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assistance are not necessarily representative of the people they are meant
to help. For example, on the governing bodies of the World Bank-the
largest multilateral development agency in terms of amounts
disbursed' '-voting shares are allocated according to a complex formula
loosely based on countries' levels of investment in the Bank. On the
Executive Board of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (the Bank's largest lending arm), the United States
controls over 16% of the vote, whereas the countries of sub-Saharan
Africa collectively have just over 5% of the vote.152 Moreover, the US
government is able to influence the World Bank's policies and lending
decisions through informal contacts or threats of political retaliation.15 3
And since the World Bank's founding in 1944, it presidents have always
been US citizens, nominated by the US government.
Another important donor-controlled organization is the OECD's
Development Assistance Committee. Headquartered in Paris, the
OECD is an association of 34 (mainly Western) countries sharing a
"commitment to market economies backed by democratic
institutions"."' The OECD conducts technical analyses, sets tandards,
and issues recommendations on a wide variety of policy issues. With its
decentralized administrative structure, it has been described as "an
amalgam of a rich man's club, a management consulting firm for
15 The World Bank committed US$52.6 billion in loans, grants, and other outlays
during the 2012 fiscal year. The largest amount (US$20.6 billion) came from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, but over a quarter
(US$14.7 billion) came from the International Development Association. See World
Bank, Press Release, "World Bank Group Support to Promote Growth and
Overcome Poverty in Developing Countries Hits Nearly $53 Billion in 2012"
(29 June 2012), online: <www.worldbank.org>.
152 See World Bank, "International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Voting
Power of Executive Directors', online: <www.worldbank.org>.
153 See Ngaire Woods, "The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank" in
Mary Hawkesworth & Maurice Kogan, eds, Encyclopedia of Government and Politics,
2nd ed (London, UK: Routledge, 2003) 953.
'54 OECD, "About the OECD', online: <www.oecd.org/about>.
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governments, and a legislative body.""' Within the OECD, the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the main point of
intersection among Western countries' bilateral aid agencies."' The
DAC provides a forum where donor countries can discuss aid policies
and try to reach consensus, resulting in non-binding policy
recommendations. DAC members submit their aid programs to detailed
peer reviews, conducted by development experts from other donor
countries. Recipient countries are not formally represented.
Norms and standards generated by international organizations
therefore do not necessarily reflect the outcome of any representative
process. The institutions that generate them may not grant much
political voice, if any, to people in the global South. References to these
norms and standards in domestic legislation therefore do little to offset
any democratic deficit vis-'i-vis those people.
A further concern about these international norms and standards is
that they may help to reinforce a managerial approach to aid. The best
example of managerialism in international norms and standards is
perhaps the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which is cited in the
preamble to the ODA Accountability Act. This international declaration
was the outcome of a series of meetings organized by the DAC during
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Over 130 countries (both donors and
recipients) and all of the principal multilateral donor agencies now
adhere to the Paris Declaration.57
The Paris Declaration urges the delivery of aid through programs
rather than projects. It exhorts donor countries to increase their reliance
on recipient countries' systems for procurement and financial
management, to reduce the number of parallel implementation
155 James Salzman, "Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development" (2005) 68:3-4 Law & Contemp Probs
189 at 191.
156 OECD, "The Development Assistance Committee's Mandate",
online: <www.oecd.org>.
1' See OECD, "Countries, Territories and Organisations Adhering to the Paris
Declaration and AAA, online: <www.oecd.org>.
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structures, and to undertake more joint field missions. It recommends
mechanisms for transparency and reporting. It also endorses the untying
of aid. The implementation of these and other reforms is to be measured
according to a schedule of 12 progress indicators.
These detailed reform proposals are accompanied by discursive
elements that convey the impression of equality between donors and
recipients. Although not a legally binding instrument, the Paris
Declaration mimics the form of a collective contract between aid donors
and recipients (the latter referred to as "partner countries"). It is
structured around five principles: "ownership" (recipient countries are to
"exercise effective leadership over their development policies");
"alignment" (donors are to "base their overall support on partner
countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures");
"harmonization" (donors are to coordinate their activities to ensure their
complementarity and avoid duplication); "managing for results"
("implementing aid in a way that focuses on the desired results and uses
information to improve decision-making"); and finally, "mutual
accountability" ("[d]onors and partners are accountable for
development results"). 18
However, the principles of the Paris Declaration are potentially
contradictory. The most evident tension is that between
"harmonization", on one hand, and "alignment" and "ownership", on the
other. For example, in Zambia and in Mozambique, donor countries
have joined together to coordinate their dealings with recipient
governments (in keeping with the principle of harmonization).5 9 But
the collective power of donors may make it harder for recipient
governments to make indigenous policy choices. Harmonization may
therefore be achieved at the expense of ownership and alignment.
Moreover, the concept of "ownership" is itself ambiguous. On one hand,
"ownership" sounds like a stronger version of "alignment". On the other
158 OECD, "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action';
online: <www.oecd.org> at 3-8.
1 OECD, Managing Aid, supra note 69 at 85.
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hand, "[o]wnership is often used by donors to mean commitment to
policies, regardless of how those policies were chosen."'60
The Paris Declaration mediates such tensions through concepts such
as "partnership" and "mutual accountability". "Partnership" evokes a
sense of equality. "Mutual accountability" implies that all forms of
accountability are mutually supportive; it glosses over the possibility of
conflict. Thus, the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action-the follow-up to the
Paris Declaration-declared that "citizens and taxpayers of all countries
expect to see the tangible results of development efforts. . .. We will be
accountable to each other and to our respective parliaments and
governing bodies for these outcomes."'
But the most powerful way of mediating the tensions among the Paris
Declaration's principles has been to subordinate all of them to the
overriding goal of "effectiveness". The notion of "effectiveness" sounds
unobjectionable in principle. However, there are also reasons to be
skeptical about a discourse of "effectiveness". First, as the political
scientist Stephen Brown has observed, it is rarely possible to credit aid
programs for significant social and economic changes; such changes are
slow and have multiple causes.'2 A second concern arises from the fact
that "effectiveness" implies instrumental rationality and the achievement
of mutually agreed goals. To emphasize effectiveness is to assume that
political questions have been settled and that only managerial or
technical questions remain. The Paris Declaration is therefore consistent
with a managerial model of development assistance.
This notion of "effectiveness" has thoroughly permeated aid
discourse in Canada, as in many other countries. In 2002, for example,
160 Paolo de Renzio, Lindsay Whitfield & Isaline Bergarnaschi, "Reforming Foreign Aid
Practices: What Country Ownership Is and What Donors Can Do to Support It"
at 2, online: <www.iese.ac.rnz/1ib/saber/fd_4002.pdf)>.
161 OECD, Accra AgendaforAction (2008) at para 10, online: <www.oecd.org>.
162 Brown, "Aid Effectiveness", supra note 120 at 86-88.
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CIDA issued a "Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness"
In her major policy speech in May 2009, Minister Beverley J. Oda
declared that she had made effectiveness CIDA's "top priority."'" The
Auditor General's 2009 review of CIDA was entitled "Strengthening
Aid Effectiveness" and used CIDA's 2002 Policy Statement on
Strengthening Aid Effectiveness as its standard of measurement.1 5
When the DAC first began promoting its effectiveness agenda, it
linked this agenda to the achievement of a set of quantifiable substantive
goals: halving the number of people living in poverty, universalizing
primary education, eliminating gender disparities in primary and
secondary education, reducing child mortality, improving maternal
health, and achieving environmental sustainability.66 In 2000, these
goals (along with two others: halting the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria,
163 CIDA, "Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement
on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness" (Hull, Que: CIDA, 2002),
online: <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca>.
161 Oda explained effectiveness as "[elfficiency to squeeze the most out of every dollar;
Focus and priorities to maximize impact and results; and Greater transparency and
accountability so that Canadians see how their tax dollars make a difference in the
developing world": Oda Toronto Speech, supra note 124. Ineffectiveness is the most
common source of popular doubt about aid in Canada. See OECD, Canada:
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review (Paris, France: OECD, 2007)
at 27, online: <www.oecd.org>. Canada stands out among donor countries for the
proportion of people (67%) who both support aid programs and consider them
ineffective; the proportion in most DAC countries is less than 20%. See Roger C
Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)
at 116ff.
165 Auditor General 2009 Report on CIDA, supra note 77 at 32-33.
166 See OECD, DAC, Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development
Co-operation (Paris, France: OECD, 1996) at 8-11, online: <www.oecd.org>.
Interestingly, in this report, the DAC also subtly challenged certain background
assumptions about development assistance. It raised questions about the "coherence"
of donor countries' policies toward the global South, hinting that donor countries
bore some responsibility for global poverty and inequality. It implied that northern
countries should consider reducing their trade barriers and curtailing their arms




and tuberculosis, and creating a global partnership for development)
were incorporated into the United Nations Millennium Declaration.
The governments of 189 countries thus declared their intention to
achieve these goals by 2015.17 Since 2000, governments and
development institutions have frequently referred to these Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) as setting a direction for development
policy.' The MDGs are also accompanied by several dozen "targets"
and "indicators", which the UN has used as the basis for annual
progress reports.6 9
Nevertheless, the vision of effectiveness enshrined in the Paris
Declaration is somewhat self-referential, emphasizing managerial process
rather than substance.170 Most of the Paris Declaration's indicators
measure the implementation of bureaucratic changes rather than social
or economic outcomes. For example, indicators include increasing the
use of program-based approaches, increasing the use of recipient
countries' systems for procurement and financial management, reducing
the number of parallel implementation structures, and undertaking more
joint field missions and analysis. These procedural aspects of the aid
effectiveness agenda confirm that development is the domain of a
particular community of experts who know how to manage
these processes.
167 UnitedNations Millennium Declaration, GA Res 55/2, UNGAOR, 55th Sess, Supp
No 49, UN Doc A/55/49 (2000).
168 For example, CIDA declared in 2008 that "over the past ten years, a global consensus
has emerged on the goals and principles of development cooperation"; it explained
this by citing the Millennium Development Goals, the Monterrey Consensus on
Financing for Development, and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: CIDA,
Estimates 2008-09: Part III: Report on Plans and Priorities (Gatineau: CIDA, 2008)
at 8, online: <www.tbs-sct.gc.ca>.
169 See Kerry Rittich, "Governing by Measuring: The Millennium Development Goals
in Global Governance" in Helene Ruiz Fabri, Rudiger Volfrum & Jana Gogolin,
Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, Volume 2, 2008
(Oxford: Hart, 2010) 463 at 463.
170 See also Stephen Brown, "Introduction: Canadian Aid Enters the Twenty-First
Century" in Brown, Struggling for Effectiveness, supra note 120, 3 at 6-8.
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Reliance on international norms standards in domestic legislation is
thus insufficient to offset concerns about a democratic deficit vish-vis
people in other countries. Moreover, a closer look at such international
norms and standards reveals that they, too, may be infused with a
managerial ethos. Such norms and standards may therefore help
domestic institutions avoid questions of representativeness and
accountability rather than respond to them.
4.2 "INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS"
International norms also appear in the ODA Accountability Act in the
form of a reference to "international human rights standards" in
paragraph 4 (1)(c). This provision could potentially be read as a formal
guarantee of rights in the context of development assistance. However,
the proponents of the Act have argued for an interpretation that
subsumes human rights within a managerial approach to aid. And to the
extent that human rights are understood as formal legal guarantees, the
Canadian government has rejected their applicability.
The idea of human rights was originally elaborated in the context of
domestic constitutional arrangements. Nevertheless, after the Second
World War, human rights appeared on the agenda of international
organizations (notably the United Nations). Moreover, many southern
leaders embraced the language of human rights as part of their struggles
for self-determination and sovereignty. The constitutions of many
African states made explicit reference to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.'7 '
Human rights first became an important factor in global politics in
the late 1970s due to grassroots mobilization and Cold War strategy, as
well as more general changes in legal consciousness.17 2 Many citizens of
northern countries were attracted to human rights as an appeal to
morality against superpower politics.' Human rights appeared to offer
171 See Moyn, supra note 12 at 109-14.
1 See Duncan Kennedy, "Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought:
1850-2000" in Trubek & Santos, supra note 36, 19 at 63-71.
17 See Moyn, supra note 12 at 3-8.
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the promise of transcending a nationalist approach to justice, formalizing
moral duties beyond borders. At the same time, northern governments
(beginning with the administration of US President Jimmy Carter) also
embraced human rights in order to infuse their foreign policy with a
moralizing quality. By the 1980s, northern human rights activists had
become professionalized and media-savvy; governments, international
organizations, and transnational corporations were all using the language
of human rights. 7"
When, in the late 1970s, donor country governments took up the
cause of human rights in the context of development assistance, they
focused exclusively on civil and political rights. Moreover, donor country
governments invoked human rights mainly as conditions that recipient
governments would have to respect in order to receive aid.175 Human
rights thus gave northern countries (especially the United States) a way
to pressure southern countries to adopt a liberal model of the state.
However, southern countries also used the language of rights to defend a
more centralized, egalitarian vision of the state: they used their majority
in the UN General Assembly to pass the 1986 Declaration on the
Right to Development.1 76
During the 1980s, donor institutions also began to integrate human
rights concerns into traditional development programs, for example by
emphasizing gender equality in education and nutrition. Donor
institutions also began to undertake dedicated rights-promotion and
"democratization" activities: for example, supporting rights-based civil
society groups and rights-oriented legal and political institutions.
Official Western enthusiasm for human rights and democracy
promotion reached a crescendo by 1990, coinciding with the toppling
1 See Nicolas Guilhot, The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and International Order
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) at 178-82.
175 See lan Smillie, "Boy Scouts and Fearful Angels: The Evolution of Canada's
International Good Governance Agenda" in Welsh & Woods, supra note 78, 41 at
46-47; Morrison, supra note 74 at 159-62.
7' Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res 41/128, annex, UNGAOR, 41st
Sess, Supp No. 53, UN Doc A/41 (1986) 186.
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of oppressive regimes in Eastern Europe, Latin America, South Africa,
and elsewhere.177
Following the end of the Cold War, Western governments and
development institutions displayed a greater openness to claims of
economic, social, and cultural rights. The 1993 UN Conference on
Human Rights in Vienna emphasized the indivisible and interdependent
nature of human rights.178 In the aid context, "social development" issues,
which in the 1960s and 1970s had often been described in terms of
human needs, were increasingly reframed in terms of human rights. 1 79
There were also increasing attempts to demonstrate the compatibility of
development with civil and political rights.8 o Scholars such as Amartya
Sen made sophisticated attempts to redefine development in terms of
human rights.8 Since the late 1990s, the mutual reinforcement of rights
and development has become a truism in the development field,
reproduced through claims that poverty is itself a human rights
177 See Morrison, supra note 74 at 323. In Canada, this era saw the establishment of the
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development ("Rights &
Democracy"), which would be dismantled in 2012 by the Harper Conservatives.
VS Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc A/CONF157/23 (1993).
179 However, many development institutions continue to resist framing "social" issues in
rights terms. Although the Bretton Woods Institutions have given renewed attention
to social concerns since the mid-1990s, their approach to human rights remains
largely individualistic and indifferent to distributive concerns. For example, these
institutions support formal gender equality but stop short of demanding programs to
achieve substantive equality; they also support protection for individual workers'
legal rights but fail to endorse collective labour rights. In essence, social concerns are
acknowledged only to the extent that they are seen as congruent with dominant
approaches to economic growth. See Rittich, "Second Generation Reforms', supra
note 73 at 225-27. See also Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2002) at 15-17.
1so See e.g. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, quoted in Rajagopal, supra note 50 at 145, 149.
181 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999).
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violation8 and that human rights are both intrinsically valuable and
instrumental to development.8
Nevertheless, within major development institutions, human rights
have often been integrated into a managerial approach. In 1997, UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan directed all UN agencies to "mainstream"
human rights into their work. In 2003, UN agencies reached a
"Common Understanding" on human rights-based approaches to
development.' Many national and international development agencies
have also embraced this concept.8 5 Human rights-based approaches are
said to include attention to inclusivity and non-discrimination in the
provision of aid, participation in decision-making, and accountability
through national and international mechanisms.
Taken at face value, human rights-based approaches would seem to
incorporate egalitarianism as well as challenge power structures.
However, critics have also warned that human rights mainstreaming may
have the effect of subordinating human rights to other projects, reducing
human rights into a managerial checklist. 6  Many development
182 See e.g. Mary Robinson, "What Rights Can Add to Good Development Practice" in
Philip Alston & Mary Robinson, eds, Human Rights and Development: Towards
Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 25 at 27.
.. See OECD, "DAC Action-Oriented Policy Paper on Human Rights and
Development" [on file with author].
184 United Nations Population Fund, "The Human Rights-Based Approach', online:
<www.unfpa.org/human-rights-based-approach>.
1 See e.g. OECD, "DAC Action-Oriented Policy Paper on Human Rights and
Development" [on file with author]; United Kingdom, Department for
International Development, "How-to Note: A Practical Guide to Assessing and
Monitoring Human Rights in Country Programmes", online: The National Archives
<webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk>.
186 See generally Martti Koskenniemi, "Human Rights Mainstreaming as a Project of
Power" (2006), online: New York University <www.iilj.org>; Andrea Cornwall &
Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, "Putting the 'Rights-Based Approach' to Development
into Perspective" (2004) 25:8 Third World Quarterly 1415.
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institutions treat human rights as a consideration, without acknowledging
corresponding human rights obligations.1 17
The approach to human rights favoured by proponents of the ODA
Accountability Act is consistent with these trends in the development
assistance field. Proponents of the Act argue that "poverty reduction"
and "perspectives of the poor" must be read in combination with
"international human rights standards"."' For some of the Act's
proponents, paragraph 4 (1)(c) refers not only to civil and political rights
but also to economic, social, and cultural rights such as the rights to
food, water, education, and health."' This interpretation links human
rights to social development, as aid policies must be designed to fulfill
these rights and must not contribute to their violation. The CCIC's
Brian Tomlinson argues that "[p]olicies and practices in Canadian ODA
must, as required by international human rights standards, fully respect,
but also, protect and promote international human rights."190
17 See Adam McBeth, "A Right by Any Other Name: The Evasive Engagement of
International Financial Institutions with Human Rights" (2009) 40:4 Geo Wash
Int'1 L Rev 1101.
188 See e.g. Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs
and International Trade, Proceedings, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, No 17 (6 June 2007) at 40
(Molly Kane) (invoking language pulled directly from the ODA Accountability Act).
19 The first legal challenge to be filed under the Act was nevertheless framed in terms of
civil and political rights. The government of Ethiopia had charged a Canadian
citizen, Bashir Makhtal, with terrorism-related offences for his alleged involvement
in a regional separatist movement in Ethiopia. Mr. Makhtal initially faced the death
penalty; he was convicted in July 2009 and sentenced instead to life imprisonment.
In April 2009, Mr. Makhtal's Canadian lawyer, Lorne Waldman, filed an application
for judicial review alleging that Ethiopia was violating Makhtal's human rights and
consequently called for the withholding of Canadian aid to Ethiopia. The
application was subsequently discontinued. See Michelle Shephard, "Lawsuit
Challenges Aid to Ethiopia: Imprisoned Canadian's Lawyer Accuses Ottawa of
Giving Relief to State that Doesn't Respect Rights", Toronto Star (3 April 2009) A18;
David McDougall, "How a Business Trip Ruined a Man's Life", The Globe and Mail
(1 August 2009) A14.
190 Brian Tomlinson, "An Overview: An Agenda for Change-Implementing the ODA
Accountability Act" in CCIC, Time to Act, supra note 117, 11 at 29.
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Nevertheless, the proponents' approach to "international human
rights standards" is also a managerial one. The CCIC argues that
paragraph 4 (1)(c) requires the government of Canada to consider the
human rights implications of its programming decisions and to exercise
due diligence to ensure that its aid is not undermining human rights.'
The CCIC's interpretation is essentially consistent with the human
rights-based approaches favoured by large international aid
organizations. According to the CCIC's Gerry Barr, "a human rights
approach to aid spending, and only a human rights approach, will meet
the requirements of the Act." 9 2
The government of Canada has used a mixture of strategies to
respond to the challenge of paragraph 4 (1)(c). On one hand, it has
accepted a modest form of human rights mainstreaming, but one that is
limited to civil and political rights. In its deliberations about the
implementation of the Act, CIDA took the position that it satisfied the
human rights requirement through its attention to gender equality and
participation and through its governance programming. In its portion of
the government's second summary report under the Act, CIDA summed
up its human rights position as follows: "CIDA supports several human
rights activities in many countries, and ensures that its programs do not
contribute, directly or indirectly, to violations of human rights."9
On the other hand, the government has at times invoked a more
formal, legal understanding of human rights-but has used this
understanding to limit the applicability of human rights in development
assistance. Human rights are imagined as the exclusive responsibility of
host country governments. In interviews, some government officials
expressed the opinion that Canadian aid would only run afoul of
paragraph 4 (1)(c) if Canada were funding a specific activity that violated
human rights, or if Canada were giving direct budget support to an
oppressive regime. In internal legal opinions, the government has also
191 See Tomlinson, "Implications and Issues", supra note 112 at para 18.
192 Barr, supra note 117 at 5.
193 CIDA, 2009-10 Summary Report, supra note 76 at 3.
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taken the position that its own human rights obligations are territorially
bounded. Some CIDA officials argue that, as a government institution,
CIDA is already bound by Canada's international human rights
obligations, and that paragraph 4 (1)(c) is therefore redundant."' The
CIDA Steering Committee on the Implementation of the Act
concluded that "current compliance with [paragraph] 4 (1)(c) of the Act
presents communications, not compliance challenges."19 5
The ODA Accountability Act's appeal to "international human rights
standards", like its appeal to the Paris Declaration, should therefore not
necessarily be understood as enhancing its legitimacy vis-4-vis people in
the global South. The reference to human rights seems unlikely to
provide a counterpoint to the managerialism characteristic of much of
the Act. Human rights can easily be subsumed within a managerial
approach to development assistance, or they can be formally interpreted
as having a limited scope of application. In neither case does paragraph
4 (1)(c) seem likely to enhance the Act's contribution to global justice.
4.3 FAILED CHALLENGES TO THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
The proponents of the ODA Accountability Act, to their credit,
recognized some of the shortcomings of international development
organizations and the norms and standards they generate. They therefore
sought to legislate certain provisions that implicitly challenged these
modes of governance. Nevertheless, in order to get their legislation
through Parliament, they agreed to amendments that effectively
neutralized these challenges.
The clearest example of this phenomenon can be found in subsection
5(3), which requires the Minister of Finance to report to Parliament on
Canada's activities at the Bretton Woods Institutions. In parliamentary
hearings, the proponents of the Act explicitly linked this provision to a
1 CIDA, "ODA Accountability Act Implementation Steering Committee




critique of these institutions and of their governance practices. NDP
Member of Parliament Alexa McDonough argued that the Bretton
Woods Institutions were insufficiently transparent, and that the purpose
of this provision was "to see the lid pried off some of that
confidentiality.""' Nevertheless, subsection 5(3) encountered strenuous
objections from the governing Conservative party. In order to achieve a
parliamentary consensus, the proponents of the Act agreed to the
insertion of subsection 5(4), which guarantees respect for the
confidentiality of discussions at the Bretton Woods Institutions.
However, perhaps the most interesting example of a failed challenge
to global governance can be found in the Act's definition of "official
development assistance". The definition found in the Act is a modified
version of the definition agreed upon by members of the OECD's
Development Assistance Committee:
Official development assistance is defined as those flows to countries
and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients . . . and to
multilateral development institutions which are:
i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or
by their executing agencies; and
ii. each transaction ofwhich:
a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development
and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and
b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25
per cent (calculated at a discount rate of 10 per cent).1 1
Under the DAC definition, ODA can come in almost any form; the
most significant exclusion is military aid." Donor countries use this
definition to compare the sizes of their aid contributions.
196 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
and International Development, Evidence, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, No 32
(28 November 2006) at 16 (Alexa McDonough).
19 OECD, "Is it ODA? Factsheet-November 2008", online: <www.oecd.org>.
198 See OECD, "DAC Statistical Reporting Directive, Annex 2" (12 November 2010)
at para 42, online: <www.oecd.org>.
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The DAC definition of ODA contains some items that rile
social-democratic internationalists (as well as some liberal
internationalists). For example, when donor countries cancel developing
countries' debts, the amount of the write-off is counted
as ODA-meaning that ODA figures can be inflated through the
accumulation of interest. The DAC definition also allows donor
countries to include the cost of supporting and integrating refugees
during their first year in the donor country-a praiseworthy
expenditure, perhaps, but one that arguably contributes little to social or
economic development in these refugees' home countries. Finally, in
2005, DAC donors agreed to recognize certain security-related activities
as ODA, such as civilian oversight of military institutions and programs
to reduce the proliferation of light weapons."'
Supporters of Bill C-293 argued that such activities should not count
as ODA. They sought to narrow the concept of ODA by legislating a
new definition.200 The ODA Accountability Act's definition is based on
the DAC definition, but it adds the criteria listed in section 4 (i.e.,
poverty reduction, perspectives of the poor, and international human
rights, except in cases of disaster relief). The proponents hoped that this
definition would ensure a social (or at least an economic) approach to
aid. However, the Act's drafters inadvertently made their definition
broader than the DAC's in one respect: they neglected to specify which
countries can be ODA recipients.
Government officials quickly recognized that the Act could be
interpreted to broaden the definition of ODA to include aid to Russia
and some other Eastern European countries that are not on the DAC list
of ODA recipients.20 ' CIDA officials also mused that military and
security-related aid could arguably be justified in terms of poverty
199 See OECD, "Conflict Prevention and Peace Building: What Counts as ODA?",
online: <www.oecd.org>.
200 In French, however, the two terms are different: The ODA Accountability Act's term
is "aide an d6veloppement officielle", whereas the DAC's is "aide publique
an d6veloppement".
201 Interview of a government official (21 May 2009).
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reduction.20 2 Officials from some departments, notably the Department
of Finance, asked why Canada should not adopt such a
broadened definition.203
Nevertheless, CIDA officials chose to prioritize consistency with the
DAC definition. They were concerned that the Act would place Canada
out of step with other DAC donor countries. One official testifying in
Parliament called it "awkward" that some aid expenditures would be
reportable as ODA under the DAC definition but not under the Act,
and vice-versa.20 4 Ultimately, a CIDA committee decided to interpret
the Act's definition to be as close as possible to the DAC definition.
(However, the two definitions cannot be identical because the ODA
Accountability Act only applies to the federal government, whereas the
DAC definition also includes contributions from provincial
governments.) With the support of DFAIT, CIDA then convinced
other departments to do the same."0 This approach meant that some of
the more controversial inclusions under the DAC definition, such as
refugee resettlement costs, were ultimately included under the ODA
Accountability Act definition as well.206
The proponents' attempt to legislate a made-in-Canada definition of
"official development assistance" can be understood as a modest
challenge to the DAC and its standard-setting authority. However, its
critical potential was compromised by poor legislative drafting, and its
proponents ultimately left this challenge in the hands of CIDA and
other government institutions unwilling to carry it forward. The
202 Interview of a government official (20 May 2009).
203 CIDA, "Meeting Summary: Third ODA Accountability Act Interdepartmental
Meeting: 7 April 2009" [on file with author].
204 House of Commons, supra note 196 at 2 (Michael Small).
205 CIDA, "Meeting Summary: Third ODA Accountability Act Interdepartmental
Meeting: 7 April 2009" [on file with author]; CIDA, "ODA Accountability Act
Implementation Steering Committee (20 April 2009): Meeting Summary" [on file
with author].
206 See e.g. CIDA, 2008-09 Summary Report, supra note 80 at 19.
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challenge was ultimately neutralized: the global standard trumped the
domestic statute.
5. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have tried to show that the proponents of the ODA
Accountability Act relied on managerialism to escape the problem of a
democratic deficit vis-h-vis people outside Canada. The Act was
designed to protect the integrity of managerial approaches to poverty
reduction. It also drew on international norms and standards, but did so
in a way that did little to enhance its democratic credentials.
While this article focuses on the ODA Accountability Act, a similar
critical perspective could perhaps be brought to bear on other attempts
to mobilize domestic law in response to global injustices, now or in the
future. There can be no doubt that contemporary global affairs involve
a panoply of injustices. In an era when Canadian citizens (like citizens of
many other countries) are increasingly conscious of global affairs, it
is understandable that they should want to respond to these injustices.
It is also understandable that they should seek to mobilize the
mechanisms they know best-domestic laws and institutions-in
pursuit of this objective.
However, global injustices can be characterized in many different
ways. Depending on one's perspective, these injustices may appear as
immediate crises or as long-term trends; their causes may appear as global
or local. While managerial practices and the application of expert
knowledge may help to solve particular problems, the solutions they
offer may also limit how we understand these problems, and thus limit
the range of possible responses. In the context of development assistance,
a managerial approach often implies drawing boundaries around the
possible forms of social and economic change-for instance, attributing
the causes of national wealth or poverty to indigenous factors, and
assuming that poverty must be alleviated through growth rather
than redistribution.
Legal and institutional responses to global injustices should
therefore, in principle, be based on processes that are representative and
democratic. This democratic imperative poses a serious obstacle to the
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mobilization of domestic laws and institutions in pursuit of global
justice. (Likewise, this democratic imperative provides reason for
skepticism about many global institutional responses to global injustice.)
A perfect way of overcoming this challenge is unlikely to be
forthcoming. Even at the national scale, democracy is always a work in
progress. Once one seeks to define the relevant political community
beyond the state, the challenge is even more daunting.207
My argument is not, however, that one should avoid taking up this
challenge. My argument should be understood, rather, as a criticism of
certain ways of avoiding this challenge. Managerialism, much like legal
formalism, can provide the appearance of an escape from politics.
Nevertheless, responses to injustice, at a global scale or a local one, will
always involve political choices.
207 See Fraser, supra note 1 at 48-75.
514 VOL 48:2
